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Is More Equality Possible in Latin America? 
A Challenge in a World of Contrasted but Interdependent Inequality Regimes
Robert Boyer1
Abstract
Three contemporary paradoxes deserve explanations. First, in America, the finance-
led growth regime has brought about a rupture with the Fordist Golden Age, causing 
a surge of inequality, because of quite specific spill-over effects from the economy 
to policy, whereby diverse social science research has convincingly concluded that 
the cost of inequality has become excessively large. Second, the Euro-zone crisis 
is often perceived as reflecting the limits of universal welfare states and the ideal of 
social equality, but some social democratic countries have resisted and continue to 
exhibit a complementarity between an extended welfare system, moderate inequalities 
and a dynamic innovation and production system. Third, Latin America, which used 
to be the continent with the highest inequality, has reversed its previous dynamics 
and seems to exhibit a growth pattern based upon inequality reduction, while still 
relying heavily upon the strong international demand for commodities. To resolve these 
paradoxes, a common socioeconomic approach is proposed, based upon the concept 
of inequality regimes. It is then applied to investigate the durability and likelihood of 
such a U-turn for Latin America. Conventional interpretations stress the universality 
of the mechanisms which widen individual inequalities within each nation-state but 
reduce the hierarchy of national standards of living. This analysis, however, concludes 
that Asia, North America, Europe and Latin America do not follow the same trajectory 
at all, since they have developed contrasting regimes of inequality that co-evolve 
and are largely complementary at the world level. This could be an alternative to the 
hypothesis of an irreversible globalization of inequality. As a consequence, the future 
of more inclusive Latin American economies depends on the interaction between new 
domestic democratic advances and the reconfiguration of the international economy. 
Keywords: inequality regimes | growth and equity | welfare and innovation systems
Biographical Notes
Robert Boyer is an Economist, former Director at the French National Centre for 
Scientific Research (CNRS) and former Director at the École des Hautes Etudes en 
Sciences Sociales (EHESS-Paris). He is currently Research Associate at the Institut 
des Amériques in Paris. He co-developed the Régulation theory in the 1970s. He 
also is Honorary Fellow of the Society for the Advancement of Social Economics. 
At desiguALdades.net he was a Fellow in Research Dimension I: Socio-economic 
Inequalities and Research Dimension II: Socio-political Inequalities. For more 
information, see robertboyer.org.  
1 I would like to thank the participants in the desiguALdades.net project who by their seminars and 
working papers have inspired a large part of this draft. I owe special thanks to Lena Lavinas who 
has introduced me to a new literature which I have used intensively. I am grateful to the referee for 
allowing me to improve the initial draft.
Contents
1. Introduction: A Turning Point in the Economic History of Latin  
 American Countries? 1
2. China: A Modern Industrial Revolution, and the Kuznets Curve  
 Revisited 4
2.1. The Outcome of Productive Modernization and Fast Growth 4
2.2. Economic Reforms Erode the Collective Institutions that Used to  
 Limit Inequality  5
2.3. Large Regional and Urban Inequalities 6
2.4. The Marketization of Agriculture Seems to Have Reduced Inequalities  
 but Capitalist Industrialization has Drastically Increased them 7
2.5. The Threats to Social Stability Call for the Establishment of Modest but  
 Efficient Welfare  8
2.6. Building Nationwide Welfare Runs against the Logic of the Core  
 Chinese Institutional Form: Local State Corporatism  9
2.7. The Primacy of Competition is an Obstacle to Society-wide Welfare 10
2.8. The Specificity of the Chinese Inequality Regime 11
3. The US: From the Golden Age to the Explosion of the Income of  
 the Super-Rich 12
3.1. The Surprising Post-WWII Growth Regime: Stable and Reduced  
 Inequality along with Technological Dynamism and Growth 12
3.2. A New Neoliberal Orthodoxy: Increasing Inequalities are Necessary  
 for Growth Recovery  14
3.3. The Rupture in the Alliance between Managers and Wage Earners  
 under the Pressure of Internationalization and Finance 15
3.4. The Explosion of Credit to Households as an Alternative to Increasing  
 Wages and Fully-Fledged Welfare 17
3.5. Financialization Enables a Huge Income Transfer to the Super-rich 19
3.6. Power Asymmetry in the Economy is Converted into the Ability to  
 Design Economic Policy and to Block any Regulation 21
3.7. The Joint Consequence of Full Liberalization: Wider Inequalities and  
 Financial Crisis: Karl Polanyi Was Right! 23
3.8. The US and Chinese Inequality Regimes are Different but They  
 Express Complementary Growth Patterns 24
4. The European Crisis: False Attribution to Welfare of the Dis- 
 functionality in Eurozone Treaties 26
4.1. Europe: Homeland of Bismarck and Beveridge 26
4.2. A Limited and Uneven Rise of Inequality in Europe, But Growing  
 Financial Unbalances in Welfare Regimes 28
4.3. A Neglected Defense of the European Pursuit of Equality: Social  
 Insurance Contributes both to Welfare and Competitiveness 29
4.4. The Financial Constraints Generated by the Crisis are a Threat to  
 European Welfare: An Erroneous Interpretation  31
4.5. The Resilience of Social Democratic Capitalism 33
4.6. Defense of Rights to Economic Security is Crucial for the Emergence  
 of a Virtuous Growth Regime with Stable and Reduced Inequalities: A  
 Hidden Precondition for the Danish Flexi-Security Model 34
4.7. Every Inequality Regime is the Outcome of a Long Run Trajectory,  
 Melting Ideas, Political Intermediation and Economic Specialization  36
4.8. The Extended European Welfare Systems and Regimes of Limited  
 Inequality are Challenged by Global Finance and Eroded by Chinese  
 Competitive Pressure 38
5. Latin America: Paradox or Historical Bifurcation? 39
5.1. A Continent Not So Poor, but the Most Unequal 40
5.2. The Surprising 2000s: A Rather General and Significant Reduction of  
 Inequality  42
5.3. The Causes of this Improvement: A Complex Web of Economic, Social  
 and Political Factors 43
5.4. A Tentative Synoptic Representation of the Determinants of the New  
 Latin American Inequality Regime 48
6. From a Global and Universal Approach to the Complementarity  
 of Contrasting Socioeconomic Inequality Regimes 51
6.1. Measuring Inequality at the World Level: The Need for a Plurality of  
 Concepts 51
6.2. The 2000s: A Historical Reversal of Inequality? 52
6.3. The Kuznets Curve Revisited: Do General Laws Govern Growth and  
 Inequality at the National Level?  55
6.4. From the Original to the Extended Kuznets Curve Model: The Novelty  
 of the Contemporary Period 55
6.5. An Interdependent and Multipolar World of Inequalities: An Alternative  
 Paradigm? 56
6.6. The Three Paradoxes Explained: How Academia, Economy, Polity and  
 Geo-polity Interact 57
7. Conclusion: A Watershed in the Evolution of Inequality Regimes  61
7.1. Paradigms and Ideologies Matter 61
7.2. The Complex and Multiple Determinants of Inequalities 61
7.3. Fordism and Social Democratic Regimes have Anticipated Inclusive  
 Growth in Latin America  62
7.4. Less Globalization of Inequality than Coevolving Contrasted Inequality  
 Regimes 62
7.5. Inequality: When Economic Power Shapes Political Processes 63
7.6. Inclusive Growth: An Unfinished Agenda 64
7.7. Do Not Forget Latin American Idiosyncrasies  65
8. Reference List: Thematic Presentation of Sources 66
8.1. General Literature on the Relation between Growth and Equity 66
8.2. General Historical and Statistical Analysis of Inequality 68
8.3. Comparative Historical Analysis of the Emergence of Welfare States 70
8.4. Social Justice and Dynamic Efficiency According to Régulation  
 Theory and Related Theories 71
8.5. Why a Domestic Led and Less In-Egalitarian Growth Regime is so  
 Difficult in China  73
8.6. Analysis of the Transformations of the American Growth Regime and  
 Inequalities 74
8.7. Recent Latin American Advances in Understanding and Promoting  
 the Synergy between Growth and Permanent Growth Reduction 74
8.8. The European Crisis is Not the Consequence of its Extended Welfare 76
8.9. Institutional and Historical Analysis of Latin American Trajectories,  
 Including Régulation Theory 78
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series 67, 2014 | 1
1. Introduction: A Turning Point in the Economic History of Latin 
 American Countries?
The explosion of inequalities across the world has attracted the attention of many 
social scientists and it is becoming a central issue in contemporary political debates. 
In academia, sociologists, political scientists, economists, epidemiologists, and 
historians have delivered new and somehow converging analyses and interpretations 
of inequality. In many countries, public opinion and social movements have pushed 
the issue of widening inequality to the top of the political agenda. A well-respected 
mainstream conservative journal has dedicated two issues entitled “Asia’s Next 
Revolution: Reinventing the Welfare State” (The Economist 2012a) and “The New 
Politics in Capitalism and Inequality” (The Economist 2012b). The issue of inequality, 
welfare and contemporary capitalism is again on top of the agenda in most societies. 
Therefore, even if this work was and still is concerned with the likelihood and form of an 
inclusive Latin American development (crecimiento con equidad) it might still be useful 
to develop a panorama of the world economy in terms of inequality and emerging growth 
regimes. Are there powerful and common mechanisms shaping all national trajectories 
or are they largely specific in response to the interplay between domestic social and 
political processes and the structural transformation of international relations? The 
task is challenging because the analyst is facing three apparent paradoxes.
(1) First paradox: Is bad inegalitarian capitalism driving out more virtuous forms? 
Since nearly three decades, i.e. the demise of the post-World War Golden Age, 
generally, income and wealth inequalities have drastically increased, to levels similar, 
for instance, to the ones observed just before the 1929 American Great Depression. 
Simultaneously, and quite independently, different researchers belonging to various 
disciplines in social science have converged toward a common understanding and 
conclusion: the structures that govern the economy and the polity and their mutual 
relations are breeding a series of mechanisms that exacerbate inequalities among 
citizens within the same country. They have proven that inequalities are bad for social 
cohesion, economic efficiency and political participation (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010: 
20, 21, 52, 53, 82, 160, 225). But then, how can it be explained why such poorly 
performing societies tend to impose their logic and reforms on better ones? 
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(2) Second paradox: Is the deep crisis of the European Union counter-evidence against 
the superiority or even the viability of welfare capitalism? 
Actually, the very idea of a state protecting the well-being of the citizens had emerged 
from the two world wars and the depression of the 1930s, when William Henry Beveridge 
and John Maynard Keynes were, along with Henry Ford, the founding fathers of a 
new national and international order. During the first phase of the subprime crisis, 
European integration and the euro seemed to have protected the old continent from 
the vagaries of the world economy triggered by the excess of financial liberalization 
and globalization. But since spring 2010, the whole European integration process is 
at risk and many foreign observers and international organizations blame European 
leaders for not having curbed further the surging costs of welfare. De facto, under the 
pressure of public and private international financial institutions Greek, Portuguese, 
Spanish and Italian governments had to implement significant cuts in many welfare 
benefits. The past synergy between economic performance and social security seems 
to have vanished and is now turning into an open conflict. Nolens volens, the citizenry 
had to accept more inequalities and even the rise of poverty as a precondition for 
restoring the confidence of international investors. This is a related puzzling issue to 
be investigated.
(3) Third paradox: Why is the most unequal continent, Latin America, now exploring a 
new strategy of development built upon reducing inequality? 
This evolution is challenging many previous attempts at theorizing about built-in 
inequality and strong path dependency originating from colonial times, the curse of 
specialization in the extraction of raw materials, and partial and late industrialization, 
all of which features have been exacerbated by the pressure of globalization. Most 
of the statistical indexes point out a significant inflexion during the last 10-15 years: 
higher growth rates, formal employment creation and surprisingly enough the benefits 
of better macroeconomic performance have been distributed to low income groups 
and not only restricted to elite and upper middle classes. All the traditional measures of 
inequality suggest a possible bifurcation in Latin American history. What are its drivers 
and will they last sufficiently long to open a new epoch? Facing this difficult question, 
which analytical tools are available?
The objective of this paper is to possibly explain these three paradoxes by a common 
analytical framework. It starts from the major findings of comparative analysis of national 
growth regimes and extends a political economy approach inspired by Régulation Theory 
(see Boyer 1994) to the issue of inequality. China has attracted considerable attention 
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due to its spectacular development, large population and ascending geopolitical role. 
Given the present configuration of competition and labor laws, the coexistence of 
less poverty and more inequalities is not a real surprise (Section 2). Next, I turn to 
North America as the second continent, since its evolution is frequently presented as 
a benchmark and an anticipation of the future of modern societies. Many converging 
socioeconomic investigations propose a convincing diagnosis about the reasons of 
demise of the post WWII capital-labor compromise and the explosion of inequalities 
in favor of group of super-rich: opening to world competition, high international capital 
mobility and financialization all contributed to an explosion of income at the top (Section 
3). 
The old continent used to be the territory of Bismarck and Beveridge who launched the 
principles of modern welfare states. The related brands of capitalism are now under 
scrutiny: is not the Euro crisis a watershed in the history of welfare and negotiated 
capitalism? Most European governments now consider some degree of inequality is 
necessary to bring back economic dynamism (Section 4). In this context, the inflexion 
of Latin-America societies towards less inequality calls for an explanation. Genuine 
growth regimes and a new political configuration, specific to each country, shape a 
trajectory of inequality reduction (Section 5). Previous research has concluded that the 
various forms of capitalism and growth regimes were more complementary than in direct 
competition with each other. This hypothesis is here extended to the related inequalities, 
and the concept of regimes of socioeconomic inequality is elaborated and applied to 
each region of the world economy. We thus understand better why three regions of the 
world economy experience difficulties in reconciling development and social justice but 
why at the same time Latin America is exploring a new path, however uncertain the 
success might be. Building upon these findings, this analytical framework then delivers 
an explanation of the three paradoxes mentioned in the introduction (Section 6). Since 
it is too early to risk any prognosis about the durability of this U-turn, the conclusion 
summarizes the main results and proposes to extend some methodological advances 
by a more precise analysis of quite important Latin American idiosyncrasies that could 
not be taken into account by this comparative approach (Section 7). 
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2. China: A Modern Industrial Revolution, and the Kuznets Curve 
 Revisited
The evolution observed since 1978 can be interpreted in the light of past historical 
experiences, as captured by the Kuznets curve hypothesis, but the origins of rising 
inequalities are also specific to the genuine institutional configuration of contemporary 
China. 
2.1. The Outcome of Productive Modernization and Fast Growth
According to a seminal article (Kuznets 1955), the process of development exhibits 
first an increase and, after a preliminary phase, a decrease of economic inequalities. 
Two mechanisms contribute to an inverted U curve between income per capita and a 
measure of inequality. The early phase of take-off calls for heavy infrastructure and 
productive investment as the cost of an increase in standards of living. Similarly the 
transfer of labor from traditional rural sector to a modern industrial sector generates 
large productivity increases, and this gap in turn widens income disparity. When the 
basic infrastructure is built and the center of gravity of the economy has shifted to the 
modern sector, income inequality decreases through a mechanical process.
This simple hypothesis captures some features of Chinese growth pattern: the migration 
from traditional rural to modern urban sectors allows a surge in aggregate labor 
productivity given the huge differential in productivity levels (Table 1). The absolute gap 
in productivity levels between agriculture and industry was decreasing from 1991 to 
2008 but only moderately, and thus the Chinese economy continues to move along the 
ascending part of the Kuznets curve. In effect, productivity differentials are converted 
into per capita income gaps and one observes a widening gap between rural and 
urban income per capita (Table 2), especially after 1991 when market liberalization 
reforms were extended from agriculture to industry. 
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Table 1: The Role of Extreme Productivity Differential in the Widening of 
Inequalities: China (1978-2008)
1991 Relative 
productivity
2008 Relative 
productivityValue 
Added
Employ-
ment
Value 
Added
Employ-
ment
Primary 7.1 48.8 14.5 6.5 39.6 16.4
Secondary 62.8 26.8 234.3 50.6 27.2 186.0
Tertiary 30.1 24.4 123.4 46.1 33.2 138.0
100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: China Statistical Year Books (various years).
Table 2: The Urban/Rural Divide Measured by Average Per Capita Income 
Differential
1978 1991 2001 2008
2.57 2.40 2.90 3.31
Source: China Statistical Year Books (various years).
2.2. Economic Reforms Erode the Collective Institutions that Used to 
 Limit Inequality 
Clearly this is not the outcome of purely economic mechanisms, since the institutional 
and legal context also plays a key role. On one side, rural and urban workers do not 
have the same rights in terms of access to housing, health care and education, and 
this inequality is embedded into the implementation and enforcement of the dual hukou 
systems (in which rural migrants do not receive permission easily to establish official 
residency, and thus benefit eligibility, in the cities where they work), which is at odds 
with a common labor law and a unified welfare state typical of most industrialized 
economies. On the other side, the institutional and organizational transformations 
play a role in the evolution of income distribution. In 1978, private incentives were 
introduced in order to increase agricultural production, and a private rural sector was 
added to the previously obligatory collective forms of organization. In a second step, 
the mechanism was extended to some industrial zones and sectors, which created 
an economic momentum in the coastal regions, which attracted migrant workers from 
poorer inner regions (Table 3). Consequently, the relatively egalitarian, politically-
coordinated collective organizations were being progressively challenged by firms 
run according to the logic of a myriad of other forms of property, and competition in 
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the market for goods. This structural change added another source for the widening 
of income differentials among firms, individuals and localities. China thus follows a 
pattern frequently observed in history: the early phase in the rise of markets has been 
associated with more inequ alities. 
Table 3: The Two Sources of Inequality in China: Urban versus Rural, Public 
versus Private Property
                           Locality
Type of property
Rural Urban
Collective Pre 1978 configuration
1
Pre 1978 configuration
2
       A        A 
Private
B
3
Intermediate stage
4
2010 configuration
A: Change in the forms of property in direction of privatization
B: Migration of labor and persistence of rural and urban hukou
Source: Own elaboration.
2.3. Large Regional and Urban Inequalities
The very feature of this contemporary industrial revolution and the related dynamism 
of capital accumulation is spatially embedded: regional unbalances are the counterpart 
of unequal development of firms and polarization of income distribution. For instance, 
Beijing, Shanghai and Guangdong contribute massively to the rise of inequality 
(UNRISD 2010: 722) since in the first phase no or few public transfers from rich to poor 
regions were organized in order to compensate the violence of marketization.
Within the same province, the diverse localities do not exhibit the same dynamism and 
therefore inequalities seem to be largely fractal: at each observational level, new forms 
in the rupture of equality emerge. This is also true within the same city, because new 
social groups capture a larger fraction of income. Furthermore, in China the absence 
of a common citizenship builds another obstacle to the equality principle: the rural 
migrant workers do not have access to the same services as those who enjoy an urban 
hukou when they move and get a job in cities. 
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Some inequalities are manmade and embodied into laws, regulations, organizations 
and this open space for policies to reduce them: the gap between rural and urban 
hukou is becoming increasingly attenuated, and the Chinese authorities have finally 
taxed the richest provinces in order to subsidize lagging provinces, and bit by bit the 
pieces of a modest welfare state have begun to be built. Nevertheless the vigor of 
accumulation continues to generate widening inequalities and this raises an important 
theoretical issue: how can public interventions help the transition from one regime to 
another (see Section 2.5).
2.4. The Marketization of Agriculture Seems to Have Reduced Inequalities but 
 Capitalist Industrialization has Drastically Increased them
The Chinese trajectory delivers an interesting hypothesis about the impact of market 
mechanisms upon inequalities: everything is up to the evolution in the degree of 
concentration they generate. When the liberalization of agricultural products is decided 
after 1978, quite all peasants seem to benefit from an increase in their real income 
and standards of living and collective property of land have been maintained: the Theil 
index (Galbraith 2007: 153) shows a mild decline of inequality within a dominantly 
rural society. By contrast the opening to modern techniques in experimental free trade 
zones creates a new dualism between old nationalized firms and joint venture with 
foreign multinationals, coastal and inner provinces: the Theil index then experiences 
a fast increase and the defeat of Tiananmen movement might have played a role in 
preventing the constitution of a countervailing power within Chinese civil society, that 
could have promoted a less unequal growth pattern. 
The competition among firms of diverse forms of property (state, communities, joint 
venture, private, etc.) sets into motion a typically capitalist process of accumulation. This 
is ultimately the driver of widening inequalities, more or less in line with the evolution 
of the world economy. Hong Kong provides a good example of the pervasiveness 
of the sequence: liberalization and concentration of capital leads to a rupture in the 
past stability in income distribution at the domestic level. Inequality across nations is 
thus reduced but individual inequality increases domestically in nearly all societies 
(Bourguignon 2012). Productive capital mobility at the world level is crucial in 
generalizing this pattern: higher growth in new industrializing economies reduces their 
domestic poverty, partially closes the gap with mature economies but also generates 
a surge of inequality within each society, with only a few exceptions such as Latin 
America in the 2000s (see Section 4). 
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2.5. The Threats to Social Stability Call for the Establishment of Modest but 
	 Efficient	Welfare	
China is emblematic of such a transformation: a massive reduction of poverty is a priori 
sustaining the legitimacy of first internal and then international (partial) liberalization 
but the explosion of income and wealth inequalities challenges the long term viability 
of this socio-economic regime. 
(1) Economic growth has proceeded accompanied by unfair appropriation of past 
collective property, such as land, by private interests, personal enrichment of civil 
servants by corruption, inability of peasants to possess their land and a built-in 
two-tier citizenship, all of which are threats to the legitimacy of the political system. 
Accordingly, various NGOs report an explosion of demonstrations and protests 
at the local level, some of them quite violent. Strong social demands are thus 
addressed to the political system in the direction of accountability, more of a voice 
for public opinion and social justice. This is a first source for establishing a form of 
welfare and expanding social transfers, but two others are quite important.
(2) The level of income is not the only concern of the Chinese population, since the 
destruction of collective organizations.
(3) Actions promoting solidarity at the work place or community level has first generated 
the hope that markets would provide the required education, health care, housing 
or old age pension. This expectation was not fulfilled at all since the differential 
access to these services across regions, between different firms, urban and rural 
populations, has been widening, with dramatic consequence for the less privileged. 
The central government had to respond to this threat and decided to progressively 
build the possibility of access to some basic welfare to a growing fraction of the 
population. 
(4) The last structural and historical argument in favor of building a welfare state is that 
the very success of the new socio-economic regime destroys the past solidarity 
at the same time promotes a permanent transformation of techniques, products, 
localizations, and life styles, and thus it creates a state of insecurity, radical 
uncertainty and potential social chaos. Only the institution of adequate safety nets 
can stabilize expectations and everyday life continuity. This was Karl Polanyi’s major 
insight and China seems to follow the pattern already observed in history. Since the 
mid-2000s, the government has decided to organize social transfers towards the 
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poorest regions, to experiment with an embryonic form of welfare and promote a 
minimum wage policy. Can these reforms succeed? 
 
2.6. Building Nationwide Welfare Runs against the Logic of the Core Chinese 
 Institutional Form: Local State Corporatism 
A converging set of studies suggests that China has invented a way to align, at least 
partially, the interests of politicians and entrepreneurs: the development of a myriad of 
local state corporatist entities set into motion by competition-led accumulation (Boyer 
2011a). In the absence of a full-fledged legal system and of a unique form of incorporation 
of firms, public authorities have the ability to define, at least locally and for a given 
period of time, the rights around the use of resources (land, raw materials, work force, 
talents, etc.) and to legitimize some rules in the appropriation of income flows. Under 
this umbrella, entrepreneurs may make decisions about production, investment, and 
technology. When they are successful, they are creating value that can be allocated 
for reinvestment, social and infrastructure expenditure, and contribution to the tax base 
of the related entity. Conceptually, this exchange may propel a virtuous circle involving 
bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. However, in isolation, such a system runs the risk of 
becoming more predatory and corrupt than efficient in value creation. There are two 
additional features of the local state corporatism. On the public side, each entity is 
partially accountable with respect to a higher rank entity that could correct the most 
detrimental forms of private appropriation. On the business side, if local entrepreneurs 
make wrong decisions they will be penalized in the competition with other businesses 
nurtured by many other localities. Thus, the local state corporatism has another relevant 
property: to articulate the various levels of Chinese society (Figure 1).
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Figure 1: Local State Corporatism Hypothesis: A Synoptic View
Source: Own elaboration.
But in this case the central authorities in Beijing have no direct economic policy 
instrument in order to promote an extension and homogenization of welfare or a form of 
synchronization of minimum wage increases in order to foster a domestic consumption-
led growth regime.
2.7. The Primacy of Competition is an Obstacle to Society-wide Welfare
In essence, the two founding social relations of capitalism are market competition and 
the capital/labor relation. Their conjunction implies that accumulation is the dominant 
feature of this socioeconomic regime. In this respect, the present institutional analysis 
suggests that the Chinese accumulation regime is basically competition-led. In fact, 
numerous entities with different legal status and localization (village, district, province, 
and so on) permanently compete to capture natural resources, capital, credit and, 
finally, product markets. Each local state-corporatist entity faces the equivalent of 
a prisoner’s dilemma: it would like to benefit from the additional domestic market 
generated by wage increases and welfare implementation in other localities, without 
risking becoming less competitive. The logical outcome is to set local wage and welfare 
benefits at the lowest possible level and the overall macroeconomic equilibrium then 
sticks to the previous competition-led regime. Hence the central government has had 
      desiguALdades.net Working Paper Series 67, 2014 | 11
limited success in implementing a minimum level of welfare, a prerequisite for long 
term viability of Chinese society. To compensate the discrepancy between productive 
capacity fast growth and lagging domestic consumption, infrastructure investments 
and sales in foreign markets are used (Figure 2).
Figure 2: Competition: The Hierarchical Institutional Form in China
Source: Own elaboration.
This is a powerful original feature of the Chinese growth regime. Entry into international 
relations is not forced by the outside but was essentially a domestic policy decision. 
Quantitatively, the opening of the Chinese economy is impressive, but qualitatively, 
public authorities still have a remarkable amount of control over capital investments, 
credit allocation, the management of norms, interventions in the exchange market, 
and the building up of large reserves in order to prevent the equivalent of the 1997 
Asian Financial Crisis. The present argument points out that the regime is not the 
expression of an ideological or doctrinal preference but the projection of the domestic 
accumulation regime into the world economy. 
2.8. The	Specificity	of	the	Chinese	Inequality	Regime
Three core conclusions and a general hypothesis emerge out the present analytical 
framework. Firstly, Chinese inequalities are reminiscent of those of past industrial 
revolutions in Western countries and they seem to follow the typical Kuznets curve 
hypothesis. They originate from the structural heterogeneity intrinsic to productive 
modernization and a related mechanism has also been pointed out for Latin America by 
the founding analyses of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America 
and the Caribbean (ECLAC) (Pinto 1970). All societies do not belong to the same stage 
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of capitalist development and the same analysis cannot be applied indiscriminately. 
Secondly, there is a Chinese inequality regime that is also the outcome of specific social 
relations based upon the fierce competition among numerous local state corporatist 
entities, mixing polity and economy into a quite resilient trajectory. This explains why 
minimum wage and welfare policies have not yet fulfilled the expectations of Beijing 
about a smooth transition towards a consumption led growth. Thirdly, this inequality 
regime would not be sustainable without the opening of Chinese economy: the built-
in productive overcapacity generated by the imbalance between wage and profit is 
partially overcome by the dynamism of exports to the US, European Union (EU), Latin 
America and Africa. Each of these entities in turn display quite different inequality 
regimes and generally speaking the internationalization makes (transitorily) compatible 
growth regimes that would be unsustainable within a closed economy. In other terms, 
globalization is the vector of contrasted national regimes of inequality. Let us provide 
some evidence of this hypothesis by studying the US (Section 3), the EU (Section 4) 
and finally Latin America (Section 5).
3. The US: From the Golden Age to the Explosion of the Income of 
 the Super-Rich
Clearly in the contemporary American economy, inequalities have been soaring but 
the mechanisms involved are different compared with those that shape the Chinese 
trajectory. Not only has the productive paradigm shifted away from Fordism, but also a 
hectic process of financialization has challenged the previous determinants of functional 
and personal income distribution. A brief retrospective analysis brings several kinds of 
evidence to light concerning this new Great Transformation and its crisis. 
3.1. The Surprising Post-WWII Growth Regime: Stable and Reduced Inequality 
 along with Technological Dynamism and Growth
After the traumatic episode of the Great Depression and the large transformations 
generated by the war, many American analysts were anticipating a possible repetition 
of the interwar sequence, first a rapid reconversion and economic recovery and then 
a new period of stagnation and /or instability. Both Keynesian (Hansen 1947) and 
Marxist (Baran and Sweezy 1966) economists shared this prognosis about the built-in 
feature of mature economies to generate overcapacity and involuntary unemployment. 
On the other side of the academic spectrum, modern general equilibrium theoreticians 
pointed out an irreconcilable trade-off between economic efficiency and social justice: 
any discrepancy between marginal productivity and remuneration would be paid for by 
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a loss of welfare compared with the Pareto optimum of a pure market equilibrium. This 
vision was made popular by seminal textbooks (Samuelson 1948).
The exact opposite was observed from 1945 to 1973: a long period without any 
depression, fast growth and a remarkable reduction in economic inequality, as shown 
by Figure 3 below. The American economy changed dramatically with respect to the 
interwar period and a new growth regime had been explored and implemented. Mass 
production techniques were converted from the military to the civilian sector, i.e. the 
mass production of consumer goods; the related increasing returns to scale allowed 
reductions in relative prices and/or increases in real incomes. Precisely the tendency 
to build excess capacity was overcome and did not trigger the price wars seen in 
the 1930s because stronger bargaining power of labor entitled unions to negotiate 
collective agreements that in effect codified an explicit indexing of nominal wages to 
inflation and productivity (Figure 3).
Unions also were also stabilizing the hierarchy of remuneration among wage earners of 
different skills and responsibility, including higher management. In a sense income was 
largely collectively determined and it was no longer a pure market variable. Nevertheless, 
this change was largely underestimated by conventional economic theories and it was 
the starting point of Régulation theory (Aglietta 1979). Furthermore these collective 
agreements also provided the coverage of unemployment benefits, health care, old 
age pensions, and a contribution to housing; these welfare components thus stabilized 
lifelong earnings. Welfare was a contribution to the resilience of this Fordist growth 
regime since it favored the maturation of a modern life style; the complementarity of 
wage formation and welfare has been sustaining a virtuous circle from mass production 
to mass consumption and conversely. Not only was poverty largely eradicated but 
inequality was reduced: this epochal change played a major role in the legitimacy of 
the post WWII new economic order: social justice/fairness and capitalism were no 
longer automatically antagonistic.
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Figure 3: The Institutional Transformations at the Origin of the post-WWII Growth 
Regime and Inequality Reduction
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3.2. A New Neoliberal Orthodoxy: Increasing Inequalities are Necessary for 
 Growth Recovery 
No socio-economic regime can last forever: its unfolding and success also trigger 
various transformations that cumulate and finally threaten its structural stability. During 
the 1960s inflation rates sped up, stagflation occurred during recessions, public deficits 
were no longer sufficient to fight unemployment, and foreign competition is hollowing 
out the economy in the form of an external trade deficit, destabilizing the virtuous circle 
of the past. These macroeconomic disequilibria offered an avenue for a conservative 
backlash that uses the historical limits of Fordism to propose a radical intellectual 
alternative: the widening of inequality and the rolling back of welfare are presented as 
the absolute requisite for a revival of growth. This is presented as necessary to reduce 
poverty, the only legitimate objective for conservative social policy (Figure 4).
In this conservative vision, inequality is setting the “correct” incentives for a market 
economy. It is the condition for fostering entrepreneurship, innovation and hence 
growth. Since the rich save more than poor people, they set the pace of investment 
via their savings; this is a return to pre-Keynesian conceptions of the investment/
saving equilibrium. The large scale of income differentials is also an incentive for work 
intensity and personal commitment of workers to the objective of the firms. It is also an 
invitation to human capital formation in order to acquire the competencies required by 
new technological paradigms. Low taxes and a lean welfare state (actually a workfare 
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policy) are the complements of this new conception for modern economic socio-
economic regimes. Last but not least, economic theorizing gives some justifications 
for this counter-revolution: the implicit social constructivism typical of the post WWII 
era is replaced by the motto: “getting the market incentives right” and inequalities are 
the logical outcome of this strategy. Finally, deepening inequalities is the condition 
for poverty alleviation, which is both a puzzling convergence with the contemporary 
Chinese configuration and a distinct rupture with the Golden Age of Fordism.
Figure 4: The Anti-Egalitarian Paradigm Shift of the 1980’s: Inequality-Led Growth
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3.3. The Rupture in the Alliance between Managers and Wage Earners under 
 the Pressure of Internationalization and Finance
The conservative backlash has not been limited to academic research and ideological 
discourse. The attack against wage-earners’ power and protection has been 
consistently pursued under the banner of deregulation of previously protected sectors 
with high union density. Consequently, most of the coordinating mechanisms for wages 
via institutionalization have been cancelled and international competition has been 
the driver towards a complete redesign of remuneration systems. Cancellation of any 
automaticity in indexing clauses, decentralization of wage formation, wide diffusion 
of performance-based remuneration, and individualization and diversification of labor 
contracts were typical features of the 1980s and 1990s. Basically, the firm becomes “a 
nexus of contracts” and competition among divisions, departments and individuals is 
organized within the large firm in order to internally mimic market competition. Seniority 
payment is less and less the standard, and promotions are decided after organizing 
tournaments in which “the winner takes all” logic diffuses further.
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The stability of the remuneration hierarchy within the firm is no longer possible since 
all these changes make large divergences in income evolution likely: the same skills 
and competences are no longer rewarded equally across sectors, regions, firms and 
even within the same firm. The macro-corporatism implicit in Fordism has yielded its 
primacy and it is being replaced by a series of micro-corporatist systems, in which the 
remuneration and fate of a worker relies mainly upon the performance of the firm he/she 
is working for. Fractal inequalities experience an unprecedented rise. Nevertheless, a 
major and common stylized fact emerges from American income statistics: given the 
quasi stagnation of total factor productivity, average real salaries have been nearly 
constant over two decades but the compensation of top level managers has exploded, 
largely because they have been linked to profit increases and the stock market valuation 
for listed companies (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: The Widening Gap between CEO and Average Wage-Earners 
Remuneration 
Source: Piketty and Saez (2003: 33, Figure 11). Used with permission.
This is the expression of an epochal change in socio-political alliances at the society 
wide level. Previously, top managers emerged out of an internal selection process 
among wage earners, and they still considered themselves to be part of the salaried 
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work force. Since the mid-1980s, they adhere primarily to shareholder value creation 
and their remuneration is aligned with the assessment of financial markets: financial 
bubbles periodically boost Wall Street indexes, in strong contrast with the poor 
progression of productivity in the real economy. This is a second and important factor in 
the explosion of top incomes and it expresses the alliance of managers with financiers; 
they no longer belong to the pool of the wage earners that contribute collectively to 
firms’ performance, in contrast to that relationship which continues to prevail in German 
capitalism.
3.4. The Explosion of Credit to Households as an Alternative to Increasing 
 Wages and Fully-Fledged Welfare
The corresponding growth regime is a priori structurally unbalanced: how can rank 
and file workers sustain consumption that continues to expand at its previous rate if 
the real wage remains virtually stable? Within each family, more members are having 
a job, and each of them work longer hours (Schor 1992) but these two strategies have 
limits in reducing the gap between unit real wage and household consumption trends. 
Here comes the other side of the rise of finance: the deregulation, globalization and 
the induced innovations propel new financial instruments such as subprime credit and 
securitization that allow easier access to credit even for the poorest fractions of the 
population. Not only does borrowing pay for housing and modern consumption goods 
but with credit they also can afford the costs of health care and university education. 
Given the blocking of an extended welfare system by the tax cut policies decided 
under the Reagan and Bush administrations, bank credit was a partial substitute for a 
collective organization of social security. A lax credit policy was in fact the compensatory 
device used to limit the adverse consequences of explosive inequalities of income 
upon the viability of this new regime.
A second feature has to be added in order to capture the novelty and specificity of the 
North American inequality regime. With the growing reluctance of firms to pay for a “pay 
as you go” pension with defined benefits, insurers and financiers propose and workers 
unions have to accept the transition towards defined-contribution pension funds, with 
all the risk associated with this individualization and exposure to the ups and downs 
of the stock market. The corresponding legislation ERISA (Montagne 2006) propelled 
a massive inflow into the American financial system and generated a succession of 
bubbles (internet, real estate, stock market) in which households feel as if they are rich 
due to portfolio wealth and house prices which in turn are used as collateral for getting 
even more credit. Thus in the 2000s, the household saving rate converged towards zero 
(Figure 6) and the constant rise of the debt/disposable income ratio (Figure 7) allowed 
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for a remarkable, but unsustainable, disconnection between income, consumption and 
investment in real estate. 
Figure 6: Very Low Savings Rate of American Households
Source: Artus (2008: 2). Used with permission.
Figure 7: Debt as % of Income Growth
Source: Artus (2008: 2). Used with permission.
United States
United Kingdom
Euro zone
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This explosion of credit and sophisticated financial instruments allowed a new economic 
regime but then quickly undermined the stability of the ratio of financial wealth to GDP 
observed until the mid-1980s. Consequently, the financial sector was no longer simply 
shifting profits from one productive sector to another, but it is appropriating for itself 
an increasing fraction of national aggregate profits (Crotty and Epstein 2008). These 
profits in turn tend to be distributed via bonuses, stock options and dividends, hence 
accentuating the gap between top incomes and median incomes which are mainly 
dependent on wages. A significant part of these extra profits originate in the relaxation 
of financial regulations which eased credit access for the less wealthy part of the 
population. This configuration reveals a striking paradox: the financiers have found a 
new source of profit by giving credit to the poor. Hence inequality is extended at the two 
extremes of the income distribution and the two evolutions are closely linked. 
3.5. Financialization Enables a Huge Income Transfer to the Super-Rich
Finance clearly not only was and still is the driver of macroeconomic activity, but it is 
also the origin of an unprecedented polarization of personal income since the 1930s 
(Figure 8, below). 
(1) In the lower part of the distribution of personal income, an easier access to credit 
makes tolerable the stagnation or even decline of the less skilled workers, severely 
hit by the delocalization of typical mass production, and the rise of tertiary jobs 
poorly unionized. Clearly it allows the ongoing progression of consumption, itself the 
driving force of the US economy. In a sense financial innovation is a countervailing 
factor against the negative impact of more acute foreign competition.
(2) In the upper part of the income distribution, the multiplication of new financial 
instruments and the alliance of top managers with financiers trigger a rapid rise 
of capital income and gains and this strengthen the impact of remuneration 
individualization along a “the winner gets all” the logic. The depth and fluidity of 
deregulated financial markets enables a rapid concentration of wealth among the 
best informed and dominant actors, compared with the slower motion of productivity 
and other performance indexes in the manufacturing and service sector.
Consequently the opening to world competition and then financial innovations define 
a new growth regime that is structurally unbalanced: income and wealth inequalities 
are functional to this new social configuration (Figure 8). By the way, let us note how 
different are the sources of inequality in the US and China (see Figure 2 above).
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Figure 8: How Inequality Favors Finance and How Finance Exacerbates Inequality: 
The Contemporary American Inequality Regime
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This framework explains why recent studies do not consider only the traditional 
distribution according to deciles but also point out the concentration of income increases 
in uppermost percentiles. Compared with the Golden Age, the highest percentile has 
tripled its share of income from the 1980s to the mid-2000s, and both performance-
related salaries and capital gains contributed to this explosion. This is partially 
reminiscent of the 1920s, but then capital income was the leading factor (Figure 9).
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Figure 9: Capital Gain and Income are the Main Sources of the Rise of Inequalities 
from the Top of the Distribution (Higher percentile)
Source: Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2011: 8). Used with permission.
3.6. Power Asymmetry in the Economy is Converted into the Ability to Design 
 Economic Policy and to Block any Regulation
In typical liberalism and still more within ordo-liberalism, the rules of the game are set 
and kept independent from the lobbying of the most powerful actors. By contrast, in 
the present phase of neo-liberalism, the winners are able at will to alter the rules to 
their benefit. For instance, in the US, maintenance of a progressive personal income 
taxation would have certainly mitigated the rapid rise of top incomes. But in fact, the 
beneficiaries of the post Fordist, competition and finance-led regime have been able 
to convince officials of the United States Government, Congress and Senate that a 
non-progressive, flat tax rate was essential for innovation, growth and job creation 
(through conversion of their wealth into investment) in order to convert their wealth into 
investment, innovation and finally growth and job creation. The conservative counter-
revolution to the Golden Age contributed also to the legitimation of this new fiscal 
paradigm (see Figure 4, above).
The change in taxation principles is impressive indeed when one compares the 1960s 
with the mid 2000s. The highest 1% now enjoys the same flat rate for income tax as the 
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highest 10%: the revision has mainly benefited the super-rich with some concessions 
to the middle class; this political coalition has been successful in redesigning the whole 
regulatory and legal American system (Piketty and Saez 2007: 12). Thus the change 
in the American inequality regime was politically driven and not the mere consequence 
of external and exogenous economic forces. The opening to competition shifted the 
bargaining power away from unionized labor; financial liberalization has been presented 
as a normal follow up of product and labor deregulation; in turn, the extreme capital 
mobility and the construction of large and deep financial markets has justified a drastic 
decline in the taxation of profit and capital gains. Such are the spill overs from economy 
to polity and from geo-polity back to economy.  
Most of American inequalities are thus collectively made by explicit strategies of 
dominant economic groups in a successful strategy to build an institutional order 
convenient for the preservation and defense of their private interest. This is the 
expected conclusion from a political science approach (Hacker and Pierson 2011). 
One novelty is that a growing fraction of economists have become persuaded of the 
same diagnosis: an entrenched economic power has been converted into the ability to 
shape collective organization, including via the diffusion of a free market ideology and 
active lobbying in favor of deregulation and the absence of any collective control over 
financial innovations (Stiglitz 2012).
Many features of the US political system combine their effects and explain the 
emergence of Wall Street power to prevent any effective public control over their 
dangerous but highly profitable financial innovations (Figure 10). First, the two-party 
system implies a competition for fund-raising for each election and typically the rich 
part of the population usually outspends the advocacy groups defending citizens and 
consumers. Second, on top of the electoral process and on an everyday basis, the 
leading economic groups have the resources to pay lobbyists in order to be sure that 
laws and regulations will take their interests into account. Under U.S. election regulations, 
these contributions and expenditures are disclosed to the public. This transparency 
actually hides what should be labelled as corruption in most other societies since it 
runs against the principle of equality of the expression of all citizens whatever their 
income. Third, after the Lehmann Brothers collapse and the major economic crisis, 
American presidents have been unable to impose a drastic re-regulation of finance 
since the check and balance principles, embedded into the division of power between 
the legislature, courts and the President, have preserved the heart of the influence of 
financiers: their lobbies continue fighting against any more restrictive legislation such 
as the Dodd-Frank Act, and until now they have been successful.
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Figure 10: How the Capture of the State and Political Arena by Key Economic 
Groups Has Allowed the Explosion of Inequalities in the United States
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Source: Inspired by Jacob S. Hacker and Paul Pierson (2011: 163-306).
In spite of recurring scandals (insider trading, golden parachutes, Libor fixing by 
collusion…) and the unpopularity of Wall Street among citizens who lost their homes 
and jobs, top managers’ remunerations still defy the law of gravity. It is the very 
consequence of American core political institutions and not the outcome of any invisible 
hand promoting pure and perfect competition. Again, as in China, but differently, the 
American inequality regime is manmade.
3.7. The Joint Consequence of Full Liberalization: Wider Inequalities and 
 Financial Crisis: Karl Polanyi Was Right!
In retrospect the macroeconomic regime, described by Figure 8 above, proved itself 
to be unsustainable as soon as the price of housing stopped rising, but this could also 
have been anticipated well before the crisis: the poorest could not service their debt 
given the erosion of their purchasing power (Boyer 2000a). Hence the adhesion to 
neoliberalism has set into motion two destabilizing processes. On one side, the share 
of income held by top 10 % shifted from 34 % in the 1970s to nearly 50 % just before 
the crisis, i.e. a configuration equivalent to that of the 1920s. Such trends could not last 
forever, for clear social and political reasons. The other side of the coin is the unfolding 
of a bubble that is bound to burst out as soon as any bad news twists overly-optimistic 
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expectations into a panic, only stopped by the complete guarantee granted by the 
Central Bank and Treasury to the financial sector. 
Long run historical data confirm the relevance of this analytical framework (Moss 2010). 
The explosion of credit feeds a boom, a concentration of income and the illusion of a 
new and unprecedented regime devoid of any crisis. This occurred in the 1920s and it 
has been repeating in the 1990s with the collapse of the New Economy financial bubble 
and finally with the subprime crisis in the 2000s. Then bank failures speed up and 
top incomes experience a steep, but temporary, decline. Consequently, the American 
financial and then economic crisis is also a symptom for an unfair and unbalanced 
society.
Hence the commodification of labor (wage tends to become again a pure market 
variable, welfare is converted into workfare) and the privatization of money (by the 
ease in the creation of highly liquid financial instruments) put the American economy 
at risk. If ones adds the marketization of nature (carbon emission trading, valuation 
of bio-diversity, options linked to climate), the basic intuition of Karl Polanyi is quite 
relevant for our times: such a society is not viable and should generate vigorous social 
movements to stop unlimited marketization.
3.8. The US and Chinese Inequality Regimes are Different but They Express 
 Complementary Growth Patterns
This rather long analysis shows that these two societies are contemporary but they 
do not display the same accumulation patterns and inequality regimes, but they seem 
to be unable to operate without their opening to the world: in a sense, their mutual 
exchanges are contributing to their viability that would not be warranted within a close 
economy context (Figure 11). 
(1) In terms of growth regimes, the dynamism of American consumer demands, 
associated to an intensive delocalization of productive networks, generates a 
cumulative trade deficit, while the hegemony of finance implies tax cuts that favor 
a permanent government budget deficit. A symmetric configuration is observed in 
China: transformed into the manufacturing base of the world, the economy generates 
a large trade surplus since the competition-led growth regime implies a permanent 
overcapacity. This feature of China, in turn, enables the financing of the American 
economy via purchase of American Treasury bonds. None of the two economies is 
closed any more since they have become more and more interdependent and the 
viability of their growth regimes is up to the management of this interdependence.
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(2) By correlation, the American patrimonial inequality regime and the Chinese Kuznets 
inequality regime are interrelated. On the American side, the permanent rise of 
manufactured goods imported from China contributes modestly but consistently to 
improvement in standards of living, and the inflow of Chinese saving permits lower 
interest rates and the easy terms for higher-risk loans and as well as the public 
deficit. The American inequality regime is thus made acceptable and viable as far as 
a real estate bubble persists. On the Chinese side, rapid productive modernization 
triggers an explosion of inequalities but the dynamism of investment and of exports 
after 2000 reduces drastically poverty and diffuses the expectations that upward 
mobility opens an avenue for becoming rich to Chinese people. Metaphorically, the 
poor welfare of Chinese workers helps sustaining the American way of life for the 
poorest fraction of the population unable to pay for private insurance and access to 
welfare. 
Let us extend this general hypothesis to two other zones of the world economy, Europe 
and Latin America.
Figure 11: The American Patrimonial Inequality Regime and the Chinese Kuznets’ 
Inequality Regime are Complementary
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Source: Own elaboration.
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4. The European Crisis: False Attribution to Welfare of the Dis- 
 functionality in Eurozone Treaties
There is no better counterexample against the common hypothesis about the 
convergence of institutional configurations under the pressure of globalization. In 
the US, the perception that inequalities are a threat to the cohesion of society has 
permeated the political arena and led to ultimately successful calls for a reform of 
health care coverage. The Chinese authorities have recognized the social and 
ecological unsustainability of their modernization strategy and have begun to study 
and implement safety nets in the direction of a genuine welfare state. By contrast 
the Euro zone crisis has induced a dramatic reappraisal of the merits of universal 
welfare systems: cuts in health care, education, unemployment benefits have been 
imposed by the European Commission in most Southern Europe societies. How to 
explain these diverging trajectories? A brief historical retrospective might explain this 
apparent paradox.
4.1. Europe: Homeland of Bismarck and Beveridge
The first industrial revolution took place in England and diffused with a lag to Germany 
and France, which triggered a process of organizational and social change that brought 
an economic insecurity and inequality widening. The related issues then triggered open 
conflicts about capital/labor relations in order to limit wage decreases during periodic 
crises, to insure industrial accidents collectively, to fight against infant mortality, to 
implement old age pensions, safety nets against unemployment and finally family 
allowances. This is precisely the pattern observed in Germany that was a pioneer in 
the promotion of a redistributive system that would deliver workers’ security and reduce 
the inherent trend of capitalism towards greatly increased inequality. This early welfare 
system is labelled as Bismarck’s contribution to the emergence of a specific brand 
of capitalism. The British trajectory is different in its timing and precise organization 
and financing of a welfare system aiming at making viable and acceptable industrial 
capitalism: Beveridge proposes an integrated system based on general taxation and 
not social contributions that organizes the solidarity only among wage earners, a corner 
stone of Bismarckian welfare systems. An international comparison suggests two major 
lessons: first, fighting against insecurity and inequality is a long historical process 
that requires a permanent adjustment to changing technological, social and political 
conditions; second, each society has found its own way and method for organizing its 
welfare system (Table 4). 
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Table 4: The Construction of Welfare Systems: A Long National Historical 
Process. Dates in the Creation of Various Insurance Regimes
Countries Industrial
accidents
Health Pensions Unemployment Family
Germany 1884 1883 1889 1927 1954
France 1898 1930 1910 1914 1932
1946 1945 1930 1959 1945
1945 1967
Italy 1898 1886 1898 1919 1936
1928 1919
1943
United Kingdom 1906 1911 1908 1911 1935
1946 1946 1925 1920
United States 1930 1965 1935 1935
Canada 1930 1971 1927 1940 1944
Source: Own elaboration.
The foundation of these social security systems opened a new epoch for European 
societies. Public spending that represented 8.7 % of German GDP in 1881 rose 
to 43.1 % in 1930 and then 46.9 % in 1977 (André and Delorme 1983) and social 
expenditures grew from 0.7 % of GDP to 30.4 % and finally to 32.0 % in 1977. The bulk 
of public spending occurred in response to the rise of social welfare expenditures: they 
represented less than 7.7 % of total public expenditure in 1880 but 68.9 % at the end 
of the same period (André and Delorme 1983: 11). The timing is different for the United 
Kingdom (André and Delorme 1983: 30) but the trend is the same: the contemporary 
societies are welfare state capitalist ones, since public transfers are providing basic 
social services (health, education, pension, family, unemployment insurance): they are 
the core of the interventions of modern states.
These institutional transformations seem to have played some role in the remarkable 
reduction of income inequality from 1940s to 1980s both in the UK and Germany. 
Nevertheless, with the opening to world competition and the rise of international finance, 
this configuration has experienced various strains that have stopped the reduction of 
inequalities.       
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4.2. A Limited and Uneven Rise of Inequality in Europe, But Growing Financial 
 Unbalances in Welfare Regimes
As already pointed out, the United States had in the 1920s experienced a concentration 
of top incomes and this feature had some role in the macroeconomic unbalances that 
led to the Great Depression of the 1930s. Canada and Ireland followed the same 
pattern. The crisis and the aftermath of WWII exhibit a large decline of the share of 
income at the top; the institutional transformations shown in Figure 3 contributed to this 
change and opened the Golden Age of Fordism in which social justice and economic 
efficiency were no longer antagonists, but this genuinely new configuration was 
subsequently eroded by the ongoing deregulation of markets for products and labor, 
and eventually, for financial services. Progressive income inequality then reached the 
level of the 1920s. The UK and other English speaking countries follow the same 
trajectory, with the exception of New Zealand (Atkinson, Piketty and Saez 2011).
The conventional wisdom would then infer that globalization diffuses the process 
of deregulation, decentralization and individualization of remuneration makes the 
English pattern the benchmark everywhere around the world. Continental Europe 
and Japan define interesting counter examples: income distribution does not shift in 
favor of the rich or, if so, only moderately (France for instance). A rather limited labor 
market deregulation, a personal income tax system that remains progressive and a 
multifaceted and extended welfare have contained the explosion of inequality with 
the possible exception of Germany that has implemented a slimming down of welfare 
benefits since the 1990s (Piketty and Saez 2007). Thus societies may continue to 
express their preferences for equality but it has a cost, i.e. a large public financing by 
social contributions and/or taxes. 
Unfortunately since the 1990s, slow growth has been the rule in Europe and this has 
generated a widening gap between the financial resources allocated to welfare and 
the further evolution of benefits, especially for health insurance and unemployment 
coverage. The Lisbon Strategy was aimed at speeding up technological change and 
growth in order to sustain the high European level of welfare, but it largely failed, 
and dramatically so for southern European countries. Public deficit spending and 
even more public debt were used to compensate the erosion of their competitiveness 
and growth potential in the long run. When the subprime crisis was converted into 
the threat of a world depression, European economies initially benefited from the 
automatic stabilizers of an extended public sector and welfare state. Unfortunately, this 
was not a typical business cycle since it meant the entering of a long lasting systemic 
crisis, especially for the Eurozone institutions. The partial recovery was stopped by the 
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diffusion in 2010 of austerity policies that intend to first restore sound public finances. 
Higher taxes accompanied cuts in public employment, reductions in education and 
health expenditures, i.e. the core component of the past socio-political compromise 
upon an extended welfare state.   
In some weak economies, the sustainability of welfare itself is at stake: public opinion is 
strongly attached to equality but economic resources no longer sustain the welfare and 
tax systems that pursue this objective. Nevertheless, the scarcity of public financing is 
not the only reason for this contemporary threat to European welfare. 
4.3. A Neglected Defense of the European Pursuit of Equality: Social Insurance 
 Contributes both to Welfare and Competitiveness
The ideological and theoretical representations of welfare have an impact upon the 
direction of reforms. Since the Beveridgian systems impose growing costs on labor 
and deteriorate competitiveness and employment, this is presented as a justification 
for welfare cuts. Similarly, Bismarckian systems are facing the tax revolt of middle 
classes and the erosion in their tax bases due to high financial capital mobility. Social 
security is analyzed as a pure cost without any positive and significant contribution. 
This reductionist accounting-based vision totally neglects that social security promotes 
wellbeing through better security that it generally reduces inequality and it may also 
be the catalyst for dynamic economic efficiency. This trilogy was first pointed out for 
interpreting the “Dutch miracle” (Visser and Hemerijck 1997) and can be summarized 
by a synthetic diagram (Figure 12).
 
(1) Education means nurturing learned citizens, a health care system delivers longer 
life without major diseases, unemployment benefits and minimum wage reduce the 
poverty among wage earners: wellbeing has been improved even if this contribution 
is not measured by current methods of calculation of national accounts.
(2) Since the provision of education, health and insurance against economic risks are 
collectively organized and financed by society-wide contributions, the welfare and 
tax systems exert a clear redistributive impact and they are tools for promoting a 
limitation of inequalities. A contrario, the individualization of insurance contracts, 
the decentralization of many components of welfare and the rise of pension funds 
are sources for diverging trajectories among individuals with quite similar initial 
characteristics. 
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(3) The feedbacks from welfare to the economy are numerous and can make clear 
contributions to innovation, growth and economic performance. A dynamic policy 
for minimum wage increases might temporarily hurt less productive firms but it is 
an incentive for labor saving innovations and a long run increase in productivity. 
Furthermore, within wage earner societies, salaries are key determinants for 
consumption and global demand and thus they may compensate the labor saving 
bias by a co-evolution of demand. In a sense, the conceptions of Schumpeter and 
Keynes are more complementary than opposed (Dosi 2009). Health expenditures 
contribute to better health, less absenteeism and a longer life expectancy which in 
turn allow for a higher return of the investment in education and training. Education, 
conceived as acquisition of the ability to learn how to solve problems for the majority 
of the population, brings a key ingredient to the dynamism of national systems of 
innovation. Nordic countries have pushed one step forward the hints derived from 
the Dutch polder model and they recurrently adjust the complementarity between 
their welfare and innovation systems (Boyer, forthcoming). They propose a similar 
update concerning unemployment benefits: they do not generate any unemployment 
trap if a generous replacement rate is complemented by an active training policy in 
order to reallocate manpower to sunrise, fast growth and high productivity sectors. 
Thus, outside Nordic countries, the rationales for a universal welfare state in symbiosis 
with the national innovation system have been abandoned in favor of a crude 
accounting approach to cost reduction, in complete disregard of the adverse effects 
upon population wellbeing, long run productive capacity and ability to innovate and 
explore an upgrading of economic specialization. 
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Figure	12:	How	Some	Welfare	Systems	Enhance	Dynamic	Efficiency
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4.4. The Financial Constraints Generated by the Crisis are a Threat to European 
 Welfare: An Erroneous Interpretation 
A second misinterpretation relates to the diagnosis made by European leaders about 
the origin of the Eurozone crisis: excessive public deficits are thought to be the only 
cause of financial speculation about the end the Euro; therefore austerity policies are 
the cure to be administered. Unfortunately this statement confuses the highly specific 
Greek crisis with the overall mechanisms that led to the Euro crisis. Basically it was 
the unexpected outcome in the transmission of Lehman Brothers collapse to American 
macroeconomic activity and finally to the rest of the world including the European 
Union. Given the size of public spending and social transfers in GDP, automatic 
stabilizers limit the severity of the recession at the cost of larger public deficits. Actually, 
for the majority of the members of the Euro, the crisis is not at all the consequence of 
lax and badly conceived public policies: just before September 2008, Germany, Spain, 
Ireland and Belgium even enjoyed slight public surpluses. In Germany this was the 
consequence of an early slimming down of welfare benefits by the successive Hartz 
programs and for other countries an intense real estate bubble fuelled by very low 
interest rates was the cause of this good but artificial health of public finance (Boyer 
2011b). The cure should have been searched for by the restructuring of the real estate 
sector and the fast recapitalization of ailing banks. By contrast, the financial markets 
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have been attacking the Treasury bonds of the countries that exhibited the larger public 
deficit, whatever its cause, thus confusing a typical bad public management in Greece 
with the spill over from finance to public deficit (Figure 13). 
Figure 13: Ireland, Spain, Belgium and Germany: Public Budget Surplus/GDP 
(%) before 2008 
Source: Artus (2013a: 5). Used with permission.
This largely erroneous diagnosis has a logical outcome: the way out of negative 
expectations by financiers about the Euro viability is then to cut down public spending 
– public infrastructures, education, health care and even research – and to slim down 
welfare benefits. These are precisely the components of welfare-led dynamic efficiency 
(Figure 12, above) that were supposed to be the drivers of the Lisbon Strategy in order 
to reconcile social cohesion and innovation dynamism. Furthermore the very extension 
of public and welfare expenditures explains the hollowing of public deficits in reaction 
to the sharp decline in world trade and then domestic GDP: automatic stabilizers play 
their role but most experts and governments interpret them as an evidence for an over 
extended and/or mismanaged welfare. Austerity policies are imposed by European 
authorities and reiterated even after 2013, when their negative impact upon growth 
and employment is recognized by most macroeconomists from academia and the IMF 
(Blanchard and Leigh 2013). A vicious circle is thus unfolding from slow growth to public 
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deficits, from welfare cuts to recession and finally from low investment to sluggish 
productivity and capacity reduction. Ex post, welfare appears to be unaffordable given 
the depressed domestic economy. Nevertheless most citizens continue to defend their 
rights to security and decent living conditions. This leads to an open political instability 
in the most severely hit member states of the European Union (Boyer, forthcoming). 
4.5. The Resilience of Social Democratic Capitalism
Is the European model built upon moderate inequalities limited by an extended 
welfare, progressive personal taxation and regulations governing wage formation 
passé? Not necessarily, since when correctly understood, adequately implemented 
and periodically reformed, welfare capitalism can prosper even in the epoch of intense 
world competition (Fellman et al. 2008; Pedersen 2008). 
(1) On one side, the Nordic countries continue to take seriously the possible contribution 
of welfare to national competitiveness: at each period, policy makers have searched 
for a compromise among firms, wage earners and citizens in order to activate some 
of the relevant mechanisms that link the welfare regime and the innovation system 
(Boyer, forthcoming). 
(2) On the other side and by contrast, Southern European countries have been unable 
to organize such a complementarity, especially in terms of innovation-friendly 
labor legislation and welfare: with the Euro, given the loss of the use of periodic 
devaluations as a compensating valve for poor structural competitiveness, they are 
unable to sustain their relatively limited but dysfunctional public sector and welfare 
as soon as international credit stops financing their trade deficit. In fact, contrary 
to the conventional view, Greece, Portugal, Spain, and to some extent Italy and 
France, suffer from their distance from the ideal European welfare capitalism, and 
not at all from its intrinsic failures.
A political economy analysis brings another argument in favor of the better resilience of 
social democratic configurations: compared with typical liberal capitalism they allowed 
a much more moderate widening of inequalities. Basically, the strengthening of workers’ 
rights in the economy gives them many tools to defend welfare and entitles them to 
be more active citizens in the political arena. This complementarity of the two spheres 
feeds back into a virtuous circle where by citizenship and wage labor nexus are both 
transformed by the implementation of democratic principles. Consequently, in spite 
of a wide opening to world competition, economic, social and political inequalities are 
contained in most social democratic countries (Figure 14). The distribution of power 
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among firms and wage earners, the government and citizens, contrasts sharply with 
the configuration observed in market-led capitalisms (see Figure 8, above). 
Figure 14: Why the Social Democratic Citizenship Protects the Rights and Power 
of Wage-earners, thus Limits Inequalities
Source: Own elaboration.
4.6. Defense of Rights to Economic Security is Crucial for the Emergence 
 of a Virtuous Growth Regime with Stable and Reduced Inequalities: A 
 Hidden Precondition for the Danish Flexi-Security Model
A third factor appears as crucial for understanding this institutional divide among 
the various European economies: a technocratic approach has prevailed over the 
understanding of the political processes that reconcile social justice and economic 
performance. Actually, the Nordic countries have been the implicit benchmark adopted 
by the “open method of Coordination” elaborated in the 2000s in order to turn the old 
continent into the most innovative region in the world while preserving the traditional 
values of social cohesion (Rodrigues 2002; 2009). The simple fact of comparing the 
various labor market institutions and welfare was supposed to generate emulation by 
all of the governments, thus transforming significantly the domestic context in favor 
of major reforms. This assumed that the polity had mainly the purpose to implement 
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economic rationality, defined abstractly by the synthesis elaborated by the European 
Commission of the best practices collected across the member states.
The very history of Welfare Nordic capitalism falsifies this quite optimistic vision and 
there is no better example than the emergence of the so called Danish flex-security 
model (Campbell et al. 2008; Madsen 2006; Fellman et al. 2008). Back in 1993, Denmark 
suffered a loss of competitiveness, a large public deficit and a high unemployment 
attributed to a far too rigid labor market. No surprise if the business association was 
asking for less labor market regulations in order to quickly adjust employment and 
recover profitability. But workers unions strongly opposed and asked for the preservation 
of employment security, thus blocking the demands for lower unemployment benefits. 
This frontal conflict of interests seemed bound to end in a dead end, i.e. a victory 
either of business or of wage earners, as usual in many labor conflicts. Nevertheless, 
as soon as the two collective actors agreed that the redeployment of employment 
was necessary for preserving future high wage jobs and firms’ economic viability, the 
protection of existing jobs was traded against an active employment policy – that was 
proposed and financed by the state along with the preservation of decent standards 
of living for the unemployed, thus taking on board the issue of labor security. The flex-
security model was born and it was the unintended consequence of the interactions 
of three and not only two actors: business, labor and the state (Boyer, forthcoming). 
Many such conflicts have been recurring in other societies but they did not deliver 
the same institutional innovation, because their history has been instead governed by 
strong and persisting ideological oppositions between capital and labor, for instance in 
France, or by conceptions that self-regulating markets are by nature efficient and fair, 
as observed in the US (Figure 15). 
The contribution of the flex-security model to moderate inequalities is thus threefold. 
First the primacy of a good and democratic education system gives to almost the entire 
Danish population the ability to forge core competences, such as the ability to learn 
how to learn (Lundvall 2011) that are subsequently mobilized as informed citizens 
and polyvalent workers. Furthermore, lifelong learning periodically updates precise 
capabilities required of workers by world competition and technical change. Second, 
long term employment is the exception and low unemployment is the rule and this 
means an equal access to jobs, at odds with the traditional juxtaposition of insiders 
and outsiders in many other segmented labor markets such as Germany. Last but not 
least, a significant progressivity of personal income and extended free public services 
for education and health do introduce a large redistribution towards less inequality. 
Thus Denmark displays a slightly higher Gini coefficient than the US for primary 
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income distribution (0.49 versus 0.47), but it is drastically reduced after tax and welfare 
redistribution (to 0.29 versus 0.34) as shown by Carlos Telo (2012).
Figure 15: The Danish Flex-Security model: The Unintended Consequence of an 
Unemployment	Crisis	and	the	Conflict	of	Opposing	Interests	and	Rationales
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4.7. Every Inequality Regime is the Outcome of a Long Run Trajectory, Melting 
 Ideas, Political Intermediation and Economic Specialization 
Many analysts might be convinced by the previous argument: from the point of view of 
wellbeing, economic performance and ecological sustainability, the social democratic 
configuration is superior to the liberal one typical of market-led capitalism (Artus 2009; 
Wilkinson and Picket 2010; Fukuyama 2012). Then why have Americans not tried to 
adopt and transpose it to their continent? The discussion about the failure of Southern 
Europe to cope with the Lisbon Agenda has already delivered an answer and the 
contrasting inequality regimes in China and United states suggest that the hypothesis 
of one best way towards which all societies should converge does not fit with the 
historical record.
For instance, when one compares Denmark and the United States over the formative 
years 1880-1933, the present gap in their welfare organization can be traced back to 
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the layering of differences in labor mobility, conceptions of society and government, 
political parties structuring, moral valuation of solidarity versus responsibility, Grundtvig 
enlightenment versus Lockean liberalism or divergence in the process of union 
formation (Table 5). Their contrasting inequality regimes are the coalescence of their 
respective history. Thus the complexity of the related complementarities makes nearly 
impossible the import or even the hybridization of any foreign model. The more so, the 
more idealized and misunderstood the configuration to be emulated. 
Table 5: Welfare as a Part of a Social and Ideational Long Run History: Denmark 
versus United States
1880-1933 Denmark United States
Labor Relatively immobility makes 
possible local solidarity
High expectation of mobility 
mutes political conflicts
International legacy Guilds transformed 
into trade unions
Difficult construction of 
unions out of successive 
immigration waves
Conceptions of State 
/ Government
 Society relations
Quasi fusion between 
“Society” and “Government”
Institutional pragmatism 
Grundtvig enlightenment
Liberty and democracy have 
to be defended against the 
expansion of government
Social nationalism, 
self-regulating system, 
Lockean liberalism
Political configuration Social Democrat as third 
way between Left and Right, 
Socialism and Liberalism
Socialism was never an 
option, nor a challenge 
Economic argument 
pro/against Welfare
An extension of
community help to self help
at the national level
Welfare reserved to 
“worthy poor”
The cost of welfare may 
hinder economic dynamism
General conception 
of Welfare
Continuation and 
updating of widely 
recognized principles
A threat to individual liberty 
and founding principles
Conclusion Welfare is a part of a 
long tradition of mutual 
responsibility
Welfare may undermine 
personal responsibility
Source: Freely inspired from Daniel Levine (1978), Tom Knudsen and Bo Rothstein (1994), Ove 
Korsgaard (2000), Robert Henri Cox (2001), Margaret Somers and Fred Block (2005).
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4.8. The Extended European Welfare Systems and Regimes of Limited 
 Inequality are Challenged by Global Finance and Eroded by Chinese 
 Competitive Pressure
Not only are inequality regimes the expression of different development modes/growth 
regimes modes, but they are also interdependent. Thus the evolution of the European 
Union has to be related to the trends generated by the US/China dyad presented 
above (see Figure 11, above). Clearly given the fuzzy governance of the EU, the old 
continent appears as very dependent on the impulses originating from North America 
and Asia, the two key players of the international economy (Figure 16).
On one hand, the repercussions of financial liberalization and globalization have 
revealed the institutional weaknesses of the Eurozone. They have first been fuelling an 
easy credit to governments and propagating real estate bubbles in Spain, Ireland and 
then, after the Lehman Brothers collapse, they triggered sudden outflows of private 
highly mobile capital away from the weakest member states. This divide between 
northern and southern economies has implied a reversal of the catching up of standards 
of living within the EU: rather moderate unemployment and resilience of welfare on one 
side, with an explosion of youth employment and significant slimming down of social 
benefits on the other. Intra-European inequalities are thus rising again. Furthermore, 
the Washington consensus and IMF adjustment programs that had dramatically failed 
in Asia and Latin America are rejuvenated by the European Commission under the joint 
pressure of international financial investors and the German government. Preserving 
social cohesion and formation of social capital is no more the priority of governments 
and the very origins of the European model are being forgotten.
On the other hand, the competition led development of China and its structuring role 
in the reorganization of Asian and international division of labor generate another 
bifurcation within the EU. Germany and Nordic countries continue to experience trade 
surpluses given their specialization in top quality, high skills and large value added 
products; thus their welfare and innovation and productive systems remain compatible 
if not fully complementary and this limits both dis-industrialization and inequalities rise. 
The opposite is observed in Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy, and to some extend in 
France. Public opinion highly values the present welfare system but poor economic 
performance makes its financing increasingly difficult. Most governments are torn 
between their compliance with European rules of the game in order to have access 
to financial bailouts and a vibrant opposition of workers, pensioners, and welfare 
dependents. 
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Figure 16: The Ability to Pay for Welfare is Reduced by the Fallout of the Subprime 
Crisis and the Loss of Competitiveness and Attractiveness: The European 
Inequality Regimes at Risk
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Let us summarize the major findings gathered until now. Firstly, the nature and evolution 
of inequality are historically and geographically embedded within various regimes that 
are significantly different. Secondly, these inequality regimes are mixing ideologies, 
political compromises and economic specializations and they thus display a significant 
path dependency. Thirdly, the North American, Asian and European regimes cannot be 
understood in isolation since they are interrelated and some of them are complementary.
5. Latin America: Paradox or Historical Bifurcation?
Let us then apply these analytical tools and findings to Latin America: why has there 
been a reduction of inequalities since the 2000s, at odds with the opposite trends 
observed elsewhere? This paradox can be explained, but the sustainability of this 
reversal is still at stake at the present stage of the crisis that opened in 2008. 
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5.1. A Continent Not So Poor, but the Most Unequal
A priori, Latin America and Caribbean countries are at the extreme opposite of Europe 
since they define the most unequal region, surpassing even the poor Sub-Saharan 
Africa. This zone has the highest appropriation of national income by the top decile in 
comparison with the lowest (Figure 17), and this extreme social divide is a persistent 
feature of Latin America even though median income is far higher than in Africa. Poverty 
persists in the midst of relatively societies richly endowed in terms of natural resources 
and in some cases even industrialized economies such as Brazil suffer from the same 
challenge. 
Nevertheless, simply belonging to the same region of the world or geographical proximity 
does not imply a convergence of inequality measures: Uruguay and Venezuela enjoy 
quite moderate polarization, with inequality indices nearly the same as in Europe, while 
by contrast, inequality is far larger in Brazil and in Bolivia and Honduras that are located 
at the extreme range of inequality (Figure 18). In spite of common features in terms of 
colonial history and economic specialization, the particular contours of national social 
and political intermediation still matter, and this was also observed within the European 
Union. 
On the surface, such a long lasting social polarization in Latin America seems to 
substantiate a path dependency hypothesis. Hence the (logical but erroneous) 
prognosis that in the 2000s, income inequality should have become worse in the 
context of rising inequalities in most regions of the world economy.
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Figure 17: Latin America and Caribbean are Extremes in Terms of Inequalities. 
Distribution of Income near 2009 (% and Multipliers)
Source: Juan Pablo Jiménez and Isabel López-Azcúnaga (2012: 5). Used with permission.
Figure 18: High Diversity of Income Distribution by Deciles within Latin America
(% and Multipliers)
Source: Juan Pablo Jiménez and Isabel López Azcúnaga (2012: 6). Used with permission.
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5.2. The	 Surprising	 2000s:	 A	 Rather	 General	 and	 Significant	 Reduction	 of	 
 Inequality 
Latin America in the 1990s had actually experienced a strengthening of inequality 
throughout the decade with few exceptions, but the 2000s shows an U-turn in Gini 
coefficients for a vast majority of Latin America economies: Brazil, Argentina, Mexico 
are good examples of this change whereas Uruguay exhibits a constant improvement 
from period to period in the fairness of income distribution; this is a new evidence about 
the relative autonomy of domestic social and political processes. 
Figure 19: The Evolution of the Gini Index for 16 Latin American Countries 1990-
2010
Source: Juan Pablo Jiménez and Isabel López Azcúnaga (2012: 3). Own translation. Used with 
permission.
Nevertheless, are there common factors that propel this reversal and will they persist 
and create a major historical bifurcation in the history of the region? Are they related 
to a common insertion into the world economy or to more internal transformations, for 
instance a better response to financial crises and the invention of new policies aiming 
at social inclusion?
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5.3. The Causes of this Improvement: A Complex Web of Economic, Social 
 and Political Factors
The concept of inequality regime suggests that no single factor is powerful enough to 
trigger its transformation and therefore a list of likely candidates, driving forces has to 
be screened. 
(1) No Major Impact of the Redistributive Role of Fiscal Policy.
Many specialists of inequality point out the strategic role of taxation and redistribution, 
for instance the move towards a flat tax in many liberal capitalist countries (Atkinson, 
Piketty and Saez 2011; Piketty and Saez 2003; 2007) is not devoid of responsibility in 
the changing inequality regimes of the US, but the resilience of a progressive taxation 
in Nordic countries such as Denmark (Boyer 2006) shows the relative autonomy of 
governments with respect to expectations of convergence. Under this respect, Latin 
America is a remarkable example for the extreme modesty of redistributive policies 
that aim at poverty reduction more than they explicitly fight against inequality. The only 
exception is Brazil, but even there the redistributive effect is far inferior, compared 
to that typical of the European Union (Figure 20). In 2006, the Gini Index for Brazil 
falls from 0.56 to 0.54 after taxation and social transfers, but from 0.46 to 0.31 in 
the EU. Nevertheless two polar cases are insightful. The most common configuration 
(UK, Ireland, Spain and Denmark) exhibits quite a high inequality of primary income 
distribution, rather similar to the average level observed in Latin America, but 
redistribution massively reduces ex-post inequality (Telo 2012: 279). 
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Figure 20: Major Differences between Latin America and OECD Countries: The 
Redistributive Impact of Fiscal Policy on the Gini Index
Source: Goñi, Lopez and Serven (2008), own translation. Used with permission under License: 
Creative Commons Attribution license (CC BY 3.0)
According to these data, the core challenge for Latin America would be for governments 
to overcome the reluctance of the elite and middle class to pay taxes high enough to 
extend the transfers to the poorer and not so much productive and labor heterogeneity 
(ECLAC 2012a). Until now, only Brazil has significantly increased the tax burden to a 
level comparable with that of average OECD countries. 
(2) Learning from the Previous Crises and a Modest Improvement in Social Expenditures 
but not so Much in Education
Many statistical and econometric studies have shown that high macroeconomic 
volatility and financial crises reduce well-being and generally widen the pool of poverty 
and thus deepen inequality from below, whereas bubbles augment them from above. 
This applies to Latin America (Panigo 2008). Since Mexico and many other Latin 
American economies have been the first to endure modern financial crises generated 
by large capital inflows and sudden stops, the successive governments have painfully 
learned not to repeat the same mistakes again and again (Boyer et al. 2004). Clearly 
Latin America has been faring far better in the post 2008 financial turmoil than during 
the 1980s and 1990s crises. No IMF-type adjustment was necessary and, however 
difficult to quantify, this better macro-economic management—moderate public debt, 
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large currency reserves, better anticipation and so on—has mitigated the impact of the 
world crisis, and consequently kept active transfer policies. 
This has created more space for a modest increase of social expenditure but still is 
limited in terms of supply of public education, health care, subsidies to housing, all 
factors that should contribute more to inequality reduction and long growth capability 
(Figure 21). Actually, Latin American welfare is quite limited given the trend towards 
the privatization of these public services and goods; this places an obstacle to further 
inequality reduction. For instance in Brazil, during the summer 2013, some popular 
movements have protested against the difficult access to poorly organized urban 
transport and the inequality of other public services for the poor, meaning that cash 
transfers are not the panacea: they and are only one step in the direction of a real 
welfare (Miranda do Nascimento 2013) . 
Figure 21: The Evolution of Public Spending by Sectors from 1990-2012 to 2008-
2010 (% GDP) in 21 Latin America and Caribbean Countries
Source: Own elaboration using CEPALSTAT.
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(3) Changes in the Macroeconomic Context: Better International Prices, Lower Volatility, 
Higher Growth, Larger Tax Basis.
Whereas the total value of exports had been stagnating during the 1990s, from 2002 
to 2007 they have tripled; this was generated by the simultaneous credit-led US 
boom and competition-led regime in China: they have triggered large price increases 
given the lag in adjusting capacities in the sector of commodity production (ECLAC 
2012b: 68). Since most Latin American growth regimes are export led, GDP has been 
expanding and has provided the fuel for domestic consumption; it has also extended 
the tax base, for example some levies that are attached to exports of commodities, 
as decided by the government in Argentina after 2002 (Boyer and Neffa 2004; 2007). 
Some of this bonanza has been channeled into the fight against poverty, thus delivering 
political legitimacy and launching a transition towards consumption-led development 
as observed in Brazil (Boschi 2012).
Most studies in political science and economic sociology traditionally focus on issues 
of power, conflict and organization concerning the emergence and transformations 
of welfare systems. Nevertheless, they frequently forget to study how the macro-
economy shapes the size of the base for redistribution: the positive and increasing 
sum game typical for a fast growing economy makes political compromises easier (in 
Latin America in the 2000s) than during a depression where nobody is eager to accept 
to share the burden (the Greek depression 2009-2013 or European 2013 recession). 
A scenario exercise (ECLAC 2012a) considers that the mere extrapolation of the 2000s 
trends is quite unlikely: no return to pre-crisis employment level in the US, anticipation 
of a possible lost decade in the European Union, and a clear deceleration of Chinese 
growth combine their impact and it is thus prudent to anticipate a clear decline of the 
stimulus generated by the dynamism of the world trade, i.e. to err on the side of the 
pessimistic scenario (Table 6). 
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Table 6: Three Scenarios 
Destination 
market
Optimistic Scenario Neutral Scenario Pessimistic Scenario
Volume Value Volume Value Volume Value
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean
4.4 9.0 3.7 3.5 2.0 0.0
China 18.3 24.1 16.4 9.9 8.9 -0.9
European Union 5.5 12.6 1.1 1.7 0.8 -3.6
United States 6.2 10.4 6.2 5.7 3.4 1.9
World 7.5 10.5 6.5 5.0 4.5 0.7
Source: Own elaboration.
(4) The Impact of the Return to Democracy and Larger Responsiveness to Social 
Demands
A growing literature now investigates the reasons for the (modest) U-turn of 
inequalities in Latin America; each discipline has its own favored interpretation As 
usual, macroeconomists privilege changes in economic policy and corrections of 
the errors of the past (Hausmann et al. 2005; Bresser-Pereira 2009). On their side, 
geopolitical approaches see Latin America moved by forces that are largely out of 
control of domestic actors, whatever the merits of more prudent economic policies. 
The specialists of anti-poverty policies point out the effectiveness of conditional cash 
transfers and attribute to this social innovation the inflexion of inequalities.
But other analysts stress that these cash transfers are not the major source of inequality 
reduction. Concerning for instance Brazil: 
In a development that defies the dogmas of the minimal state, the labor market 
(employment and minimum wage) accounted for nearly 60% of the fall in social 
inequality; Social Security benefits contributed with 27%; and the Bolsa Família along 
with other safety net programs alike with 13%. The process of market inclusion was 
consequently the result of job growth coupled with a spreading out of monetary cash 
transfers, both contributory (pegged to the minimum wage) and non-contributory, a 
phenomenon that increased average income and enhanced commodification to 
compensate for government failures to provide basic services (Fagnani 2013).
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Furthermore demographic changes should be brought into the analysis: since fertility 
rate is inversely correlated to income in cross national analyses (Schultz 2005), its 
decline might have played some role in the poverty reduction observed in Latin America. 
Since welfare systems are complex organizations/institutions interweaving economy, 
family, civil society and state (Théret 1997), the nature of political intermediation should 
also be brought into the picture. Actually, the successive transitions towards more 
democratic constitutions and regimes has made governments more responsive to the 
demand of a large fraction of the population previously excluded from the concerns of 
the ruling elite (Gómez-Sabaíni et al. 2011). 
5.4. A Tentative Synoptic Representation of the Determinants of the New Latin 
 American Inequality Regime
A priori each of these explanations is rather compatible with or even complementary 
to the others, and they are neither exclusive nor contradictory. Logically, the absence 
of many of the related transformations would have prevented the inflexion of inequality 
and conversely when they are jointly operating, past determinisms can be altered 
towards a more inclusive growth (Figure 22).
For instance, good international perspectives may be wasted by a poor and short 
sighted macroeconomic policy and thus it may nurture a financial crisis quite detrimental 
to well-being and social inclusion. 
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Figure 22: A Systemic Approach to the Factors Contributing to a Reduction in 
Latin American Inequality
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Source: Freely inspired among others by Juan Pablo Jiménez and Isabel López Azcúnaga (2012); Luis 
Miotti, Carlos Quenan, Edgardo Torija Zane (2012).
Second example, many social movements may ask for a better social protection but 
an authoritarian government defending some limited private interests can block these 
demands: democratic institutions usually help in the search for a more egalitarian 
distribution of income and wealth. 
This shows that path dependency does equate with reproduction ad infinitum of a 
given mode of development and inequality regime.
Let us now compare Latin American societies with the inequality regimes of the other 
zones of the world economy, respectively captured by Figure 2 for China, Figure 8 for 
the US and Figure 16 for the European Union. Clear distinctive features appear:
(1) Firstly, an integration into the world economy, mainly via the export of primary 
commodities, was detrimental when their terms of trade were declining during the 
post WWII period with the domination of Fordism but it became a trump when 
China and Asia were industrializing and importing massively the natural resources 
required by their fast and steady take off.
(2) Secondly, whereas democratic institutions are well established in Europe and North 
America, they are quite recent in most Latin American societies and de facto this 
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political shift has entitled the expression of demands for social protection that, at 
last, have been taken seriously and partially fulfilled.
 
(3) Thirdly, the succession of economic crises, largely generated by a fast liberalization 
and opening to international capital flows, has promoted the emergence of pragmatic 
policies and reforms, correcting the adverse effects of the adhesion to the belief that 
market mechanisms alone were sufficient to propel development. The constitution 
of a moderate welfare system has now become perceived to be a condition for long 
term social sustainability and political legitimacy.
(4) Last but not least, the limits of export-led development were clearly perceived by 
experts and governments. In this context, the constitution of a welfare system and 
a labor policy synchronizing wages along with growth or productivity appear as 
key drivers in the direction of a more inward looking strategy (Saboia 2010). This 
is a clear opportunity for large size economies, such as Brazil, whereas it should 
be an incentive for others to join projects of regional economic integration in order 
to organize at the relevant level, the synchronization of welfare and production 
systems.
Given the implications of these transformations it is difficult to assess whether the 
institutional configurations have evolved towards new and more coherent growth 
regimes or if the recent good macroeconomic performance and inequality reduction 
are mainly the outcome of world bonanza that could be reversed. The slowdown of 
Brazil economy in 2013 and the economic and political tensions observed in Argentina 
since the early 2010s suggest that the jury is still out. 
In any case, these four transformations shed some light on the Latin American paradox 
pointed in the introduction: the most unequal continent is exploring a “growth with equity” 
strategy that is replicating neither the US nor the European experiences, because of 
a genuinely distinctive economic, social and political history. Of course some other 
factors might be similar across the three regions. For instance in Latin America too, 
the evolution of finance has entitled credit to compensate slowly growing or stagnating 
household incomes and thus to sustain domestic consumption. Similarly poor people 
generally pay higher interest rates than the rich and this is a source of extra financial 
profit and widening of income and wealth inequality. Consequently, financial instability 
could strike again Latin America, originating domestically or internationally. Thus a 
major issue arises: how autonomous and resilient is this model of growth with social 
inclusion? 
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6. From a Global and Universal Approach to the Complementarity 
 of Contrasting Socioeconomic Inequality Regimes
It is time to search for a synthesis and birds-eye perspective: how do the domestic 
arena and the international system interact in the genesis and evolution of economic 
inequality? Let us first review recent statistical results, then revisit the foundational 
Kuznets hypothesis and finally propose our own framework based upon the joint 
analysis of different inequality regimes and their co-evolution.
6.1. Measuring Inequality at the World Level: The Need for a Plurality of 
 Concepts
From a global perspective, growth theory suggests to capture the impact of unequal 
development upon income per capita at the level of each nation-state, where statistics 
are available over long periods due to data collection by public authorities, and whose 
archives are subsequently revisited by economic historians. Century-long data then 
show that according to this first concept, inequality grows along the unfolding of 
industrial and capitalist revolutions, the only exception being the post-WWII period 
when various forms of developmental states have been counteracting the previous 
trends observed since 1820 (Milanovic 2007: 29). 
Nevertheless such a measure does not take into account that the population size varies 
tremendously between Luxembourg and Switzerland on one side and China and India 
on the other. Therefore weighting each national income per capita by population size 
corresponds to a second concept for international inequality. The picture is not very 
different: a long term increase of inequality from 1850 to 1940 and stability during the 
Golden Age when both international and domestic inequalities were stabilized via the 
containment of market forces by institutions, organizations and the Bretton Woods 
system (Milanovic 2007: 30).
The internal inequality within each nation-state is not taken into account by these 
two indices, since the same average income is fictively attributed to each individual 
citizen of a nation-state. With the availability of individual income statistics for a 
growing number of countries since the 1980s, a third concept of global inequality can 
be given a measure and compared: the same weight is attributed to each individual 
with its actual income, converted into a common PPP index. No surprise, the global 
inequality measure shows larger inequality than the international one, but it seems 
that after 1990, this measure shows a mild decline. Since the statistical sources are 
different, this second set of data points out an interesting methodological issue: the 
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take-off occurring in India, China and other populous countries has reduced weighted 
international inequality, whereas the un-weighted index exhibits on the contrary a rapid 
increase (Milanovic 2007: 32). 
6.2. The 2000s: A Historical Reversal of Inequality?
The updating of household surveys that recently have been extended to a growing 
number of countries, including Africa, delivers more accurate but still imperfect 
estimates of global inequality that enlighten the lively debate about the complex links 
between globalization and inequality with new findings. Basically the three concepts 
of inequality yield the same conclusion: since the 2000s, the decline in international 
inequality is because rich countries growth is now slow and economic dynamism is on 
the side of emerging economies with huge (China and India) or large (Indonesia, Brazil 
and Turkey) populations; thus weighted international inequality decreases still more 
rapidly; this upward trend of the average per capita income of these countries overcomes 
the widening of internal inequality that prevails for most of them. The defenders of 
globalization as a driver for development find here a long awaited confirmation of their 
hopes (Figure 23).
This is an invitation to compare the evolutions of this global inequality with some 
emblematic national trajectories. The difference of levels between Brazil and 
Sweden is striking, and the USA exhibit an intermediate Gini coefficient, increasing 
but moderately, at least compared with the gap with Brazil. Of course size matters: 
the most egalitarian nations are small (Sweden, Denmark, Uruguay, Switzerland,…) 
whereas continental economies are a priori quite heterogeneous: solidarity supposes 
trust and reciprocity and they are easier to nurture in densely connected societies. 
Hence a difficult theoretical question: at what level (the world, the nation, the locality or 
the community) and in what arena (the firm, the economy, polity, the access to basic 
public goods) are the conceptions of social justice forged? Consequently the various 
indexes are built by each researcher according to her/his own purpose: they acquire 
a social relevance only when collective actors use them in support for their demands 
to governments. In this aspect, the concept global inequality has so far attracted few 
supporters outside some ad hoc international organizations and a few individuals who 
perceive themselves to be “citizens of the world” ready to express their solidarity at this 
level by consenting to large and possibly long lasting transfers (Figure 24).
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Figure 23: Two Measures of International Inequality versus an Assessment of 
Global	Inequality.	Gini	Coefficient	1952-2011.
6
which are the huge success cases of that period and the two most populous countries in the world, 
do not enter into calculation of Inequality 1 with greater weights than any other country.  
Figure 2. International and global inequality, 1952-2011: 
“The mother of all inequality disputes” 
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Let us now  consider further Figure 2. Why is it called “the mother of all inequality 
disputes”? To see what the dispute is about, consider the difference in the movements of Inequality 
1 and Inequality 2. While the first, as we just saw, rose during the globalization era, the second 
declined, at times even dramatically. Measured by Inequality 2, the world has certainly become a 
much better (“more convergent” or more equal) place precisely during the same period. Thus, those 
who desire to emphasize the unevenness of globalization tend to focus on growing inter-country 
gaps, not taking into account sizes of population, and prefer Inequality 1. Those who, on the 
contrary, wish to focus on positive aspects of globalization tend to favor Concept 2, and to point to 
the indubitable successes of China and India. In effect, to grasp intuitively why and how Concept 2 
inequality declined, we need just to recall that in these calculations, China counts a lot because of 
its large population size. And China, starting in the 1980s from an extremely low level of income, 
Source: Branko Milanovic (2012: 6),”Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: History and now”, Figure 
2. Used with permission.2
Figure 24: National Differentiation of Inequality across Nation-states, but Much 
S all r	 than	 he	 Inequality	 among	 Individua s	 in	 the	 World.	 Gini	 Coefficient	
1968-2005.
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quarters of  (the poorer) world population are needed to get to the first 1/5th of total income, but 
only 1.7% of those at the top suffice to  get to the last one-fifth.   
Global inequality is much greater than inequality within any individual country. In Figure 3, 
global Gini of 70 is shown together with the Ginis for several countries. Global inequality is 
substantially greater than inequality in Brazil, a country that is often held, despite the recent 
improvements under the Lula presidency, as an exemplar of excessive inequality. And it is almost 
twice as great as inequality in the United States.5
Figure 3. Global Gini coefficient compared to the Ginis of selected countries
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How confident are we that these numbers truly reflect what is happening to inequality 
among world citizens? The global inequality numbers come from calculations done across 
representative national surveys which monitor incomes or consumption of households. About 120 
such surveys stand behind each of the six dots shown in Figures 2 and 3. These 120 surveys include 
actual incomes or consumption levels for about 10 million people in the world. This is about 1.5% 
of the current world population, not a negligible number, and in principle, sufficiently 
5 The vertical axis in Figure 3 shows Gini coefficient in its “natural” values, i.e., not in percentages. Thus a Gini of 0.7 
displayed there is the same as a Gini of 70. For simplicity, we use the second approach throughout the paper. 
Source: Branko Milanovic (2012: 9),”Global Income Inequality by the Numbers: History and now”, Figure 
3. Used with permission.
2 Figures 23-25 are presented here with the permission of the World Bank: The World Bank authorizes 
the use of this material subject to the terms and conditions on its website, http://www.worldbank.org/
terms.
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Figure 25: A Historical Shift in the Source of Global Inequality: More Linked to 
Citizenship	than	Internal	Social	Stratification	(Theil	Coefficient).1870	and	2000
18
inequality would have charted a gigantic inverted U-shaped curve and perhaps in some fifty years—
if the emerging market economies continue to grow faster than the rich world—we might be back to 
the state of affairs that existed around the time of the Industrial Revolution. 
But, for now, we are still very far from it. And perhaps nothing shows it better than Figure 6.
There the height of the bar represents the Theil coefficient of global inequality  in two baseline 
years: 1870 and 2000.7 The height of the bar is much greater  now, meaning that global inequality 
today is greater than in 1870, which of course is not a surprise. 8
Figure 6. A Non-Marxian world: 
Level and composition of global inequality in the 19th century and around year 2000 
(measured by the Theil index) 
Note: I use Theil mean log deviation because it is exactly decomposable (as between “class” and “location”) and 
because the importance of each component does not depend on the rest of the decomposition. Anand and Segal (2008) 
in their review of global inequality studies suggest that it is the most appropriate inequality index for this kind of 
decomposition.   
7 Theil coefficient, named after the Dutch econometrician Henri Theil, is another way to measure inequality. It is not as 
popular, nor is its meaning as intuitive, as Gini, but in this case, when we have to decompose inequality into two 
components, Theil coefficient is preferable to Gini whose decomposition is not “exact”. That is, with the Gini there is a
residual terms whose interpretation is not always clear.
8 The results would have been the same with the Gini.
Sourc : Brank  M lanov c (2012: 18), Figure 6. Used with permission.
This leads to a proposal: can available statistics decompose global inequality into one 
part related to citize ship in o e country and anoth r linked to the posi ion of individuals 
within this country? Bra ko Milanovic calls the first “location” the other “class” (2012) 
and he analyzes the Theil index between 1870 and 2000. As far as the quality of 
data allows, inequality was mainly related to class in the 19th century, but today the 
discriminating factor is where individuals live, i.e. on average, location matters much 
more than occupation within each society. This result implies that national economies 
continue to be the place were solidarity is expressed and they are the outcome of 
a century-long process of institution building to promote the diffusion of gains from 
technical change (Figure 25).
Of course, several other regional entities are emerging and attempt to usurp some or 
all of the functions of nation-states (North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Southern Common Market 
(MERCOSUR), the European Union (EU)) but the process is far from mature enough 
to contribute to the emergence of inequality regimes at the regional level and even less 
at the world level. Growth and Inequality regimes are still embedded into the national 
social fabric.
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6.3. The Kuznets Curve Revisited: Do General Laws Govern Growth and 
 Inequality at the National Level? 
As previously presented (Section 2.1 above), the Kuznets hypothesis states that 
modernization first increases inequalities as it matures and then endogenous forces 
imply a reversal towards more equality. Nowadays, it can be tested over a large sample 
of periods and countries (Galbraith 2012) and a simple graphical analysis shows how 
fuzzy such a simple coevolution is (Figure 26). One could argue that each industrial 
revolution starts a new inverted U-curve and that some economies continue to explore 
the maturing phase of the previous industrial revolution while others climb a new 
Kuznets curve. Nevertheless the global picture becomes quite complex and given the 
intricacy of the factors that sustain growth, it is somewhat illusory to extract a simple 
relation between growth and inequality: it is at best a reduced form of a fully-fledged 
model and thus there is no reason to think that it needs to be invariant for all regimes. 
At best, the idea of a” succession of phases à la Kuznets” is a pedagogical device in 
order to classify the results of national case studies and explicate that, within the same 
calendar time, China may explore the ascending part of Kuznets’ curve, while Brazil 
enters a period of reduced inequality and the United States launches a paradigm shift 
that generates new sources of inequality (Figure 27). Another avenue for research is 
the test of multivariate regression, which simultaneously examines a long list of other 
variables in order to better capture the diversity of national experiences. For instance, 
inequality is better explained by the conjunction of income per capita when a trend is 
added to the variables, but it is probably a proxy for other missing variables (Galbraith 
2007: 170). 
 
 Boyer - Is More Equality Possible in Latin America? | 56
6.4. From the Original to the Extended Kuznets Curve Model: The Novelty of 
 the Contemporary Period
Figure 26: An Interdependent World, Complementarity of National Inequality 
Regimes and Development Modes
Source: Inequality and Instability. A Study of the World Economy Just before the Great Crisis by Galbraith 
(2012: 65), Fig. 3.8. Used by permission of © Oxford University Press (USA).
Figure 27: A Stylized Augmented Kuznets Curve, with Selected Countries in 
Illustrative Positions
 
Source: Inequality and Instability. A Study of the World Economy Just before the Great Crisis by Galbraith 
(2012: 53), Fig. 3.1. Used by permission of © Oxford University Press (USA).
An alternative takes seriously the historical time, i.e. that of the transformations of 
social relations, organizations, institutions and technologies. Within a Régulation 
theory approach, social and political history shapes each national development mode 
and several configurations have emerged within the same epoch featuring a specific 
production and innovation paradigm (Boyer and Saillard 2001). Therefore the fuzziness 
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of the Kuznets curve is not a surprise but the projection of the diversity of inequality 
regimes, closely associated to contrasted development modes.
6.5. An Interdependent and Multipolar World of Inequalities: An Alternative 
 Paradigm?
The present framework faces one major objection: if there is no single pattern in 
development modes and inequality regimes, how to explain their persistence? We 
have progressively shown that they are forming a rather coherent or at least compatible 
system at the world level (Figure 28). 
(1) The explosion of top income within the finance-led growth in the United States 
is the symmetric of the widening of inequality generated by the fast productive 
modernization in China. This is not the only co-evolution within the world economy. 
(2) The Euro crisis too and the threat upon extended welfare systems and defense 
of social solidarity are the consequence of the joint pressure of Chinese rapidly 
catching up in most industries; and the recurring global financial crises generated 
by the American victory in promoting liberalization and globalization of trade, capital, 
and finance. 
(3) The Latin American paradox – an atypical decline in economic inequality starting 
from an extreme social polarization – is also explained by its specialization that is 
complementary to that of China and the US, the ability to learn from the past financial 
crises and the transition to democracy as providing finally a positive response to 
demands for social protection. 
The macro-economic imbalances, generated by the widening of inequality within each 
domestic economy, are symmetric in the US and in China and consequently only the 
compensating movements in international trade and finance allows the viability of 
socio-economic regimes that could not be sustained within closed borders: abundant 
credit to sustain the American way of living with stagnant average real income in the 
US, dramatic industrial overcapacity due to the squeeze of labor share in China; low 
American household saving rate versus Chinese high savings, partially channeled 
back to the US financial system.
 
Thus the internationalization of production, capital and finance makes compatible 
and viable contrasted inequality regimes, themselves embedded into complementary 
development modes. Furthermore, this explains the puzzling observation of opposite 
evolutions concerning inequality: less inequality between nations since globalization 
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entitles a variety growth regimes – credit led, export led, innovation led – but each of 
these regimes nurtures widening inequalities for individuals within the same nation-
state, i.e. the two major stylized fact identified in Section 6.2.
Figure 28: An Interdependent World, Complementarity of National Inequality 
Regimes and Development Modes  
   
 Figure 26 – An Interdependent World, Complementarity of National Inequality Regimes and Development Modes 
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Source: Own elaboration.
6.6. The Three Paradoxes Explained: How Academia, Economy, Polity and 
 Geo-polity Interact
This analytical framework delivers also an interpretation of the puzzling observations 
made in the introduction (Table 7). The explanation combines a cognitive approach 
(how does pure economic theorizing analyze the links between economic activity and 
income distribution?), a positive study of the consequence of asymmetric economic 
power upon inequality, an investigation of the forces that shape state interventions and 
finally a recognition of the hierarchical relations that govern the world economy.
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(1) First paradox: Is bad inegalitarian capitalism driving out more virtuous forms? 
 Why such an increase of inequality in most economies, in spite of the converging 
evidences from various social sciences that they are costly and detrimental to 
economic performance and wellbeing? Mainly because dominant economic 
interests have use a non-relevant theorizing of a pure abstract market economy 
to hide their ability to appropriate the rents typical of quite imperfect competition, 
to design complex and dangerous but profitable new financial products and finally 
to capture the state as their insurer of last resort, to the detriment of the rest of the 
society. The finance-led American capitalism is emblematic of this configuration and 
given its hierarchical position within the international relations, this vision has been 
exported to other continents and regions – frequently via international institutions – 
however different might be their actual modes of regulation. 
(2) Second paradox: Is the deep crisis of the European Union counter-evidence against 
the superiority or even the viability of welfare capitalism? 
 If limited inequality is good for social cohesion and economic performance, how 
can we then explain the slow growth and the Euro crisis of the European Union, 
the homeland of welfare capitalisms: in the era of “globalization,” are they passé? 
Basically most governments have forgotten why welfare can be an asset in the 
formation of social capital and hence competitiveness, the European integration 
has been almost exclusively built upon the promotion of competition with few or 
any solidarity between unequally advanced economies, and the transmission 
to Europe of the crisis of liberalized finance has falsely been interpreted as the 
consequence of excessive public deficits. Clearly national welfare systems have 
thus been challenged and destabilized, but weak European governance has been 
unable to promote and implement the required welfare state at the continental 
level. Nevertheless Northern Europe – Germany, Austria and Nordic countries – 
continues to show that an extended welfare system may still limit inequality and 
may contribute to economic resilience and success.
(3) Third paradox: Why is the most unequal continent, Latin America, now exploring a 
new strategy of development built uopon reducing inequality?
 Why has Latin America, the territory of long lasting and wide inequalities, experienced 
a modest but significant reversal of income inequality since the 2000s? Actually a 
long history of costly financial and economic crises had finally the merit of repealing 
the Washington consensus and it has set into motion a more pragmatic learning 
process towards better macroeconomic management and reforms that would build 
 Boyer - Is More Equality Possible in Latin America? | 60
a modest but effective safety net. The polity is not absent in this process since the 
shift from authoritarian to more democratic regimes has led to a better response 
to social movements’ demands for a modicum security. A genuine Latin American 
development theory might emerge, stimulated by the new international context, 
where primary resources and ecology are expected to become the major constraints 
upon the future of growth, both for mature and emerging economies. It is too early to 
diagnose whether the 2010s will mean a tipping point in the emergence of “growth 
with social inclusion” paradigm, since a lot is up to the evolution of the rest of the 
world. For instance will a South/South complementarity (between Brazil and China 
for instance) shape the future international system or will another North/South 
hierarchy (the US pivot towards Asia) emerge? Geopolitics should not be forgotten 
in any prognosis about a long term reduction of inequality in Latin America.
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Table 7: The Three Paradoxes: The Outcome of Four Entangled Processes
Academia
Neo-Walrasian 
Economics
Economy
Asymmetric 
power from 
imperfect market
Polity
Capture of 
the state by 
dominant 
economic 
interest
Geopolity
Changing 
world system
Paradox 1
Large cost of 
inequalities but 
they are rising
Triumph of 
ideology over 
scientific results
Privatization 
of utilities, 
appropriation of 
rents, onscurity of 
financial products
 A minority 
(exporters, 
rentiers, 
financiers) 
imposes its 
socioeconomic 
regime
Larger impact 
of ideologies 
than scientific 
results
Paradox 2
European 
Union crisis: 
that of Welfare 
State
Inability to 
economically 
justify an 
universal 
Welfare State
Prevalence 
of market 
competition over 
social Europe 
building
Primacy of 
finance over 
national 
sovereignty, 
lobbying more 
than political 
deliberation
EU a second 
rank player, 
unable to 
conceptualize 
and diffuse 
its model
Paradox 3
Latin America: 
reduced 
inequalities 
in the era 
of global 
inequalities
Learning for 
past  crises 
and errors, 
emergence 
of a new 
developmentism
More rent 
seeking and 
monopoly than 
entrepreneurship 
do limit inequality 
reduction
Positive role of 
democratization 
but still quite 
unequal access 
to the state
Progressive 
but relative 
autonomization 
with respect 
to the 
Washington 
Consensus
Source: Own Elaboration.
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7. Conclusion: A Watershed in the Evolution of Inequality Regimes 
This panorama of socioeconomic inequality regimes across the world allows some 
provisional conclusions and avenues for further researches.
7.1. Paradigms and Ideologies Matter
The demise of the Beveridgian and Keynesian intellectual consensus has played a role 
in the legitimation of and in some countries the acceptance of widening inequalities by 
a large fraction of policy makers. With the comeback of new classical, pre-Keynesian 
macroeconomic theories, the search for social justice has been again presented as 
intrinsically detrimental to economic efficiency, and this aggiornamento has started 
from the US and the UK, and diffused largely to the rest of the world. Of course, 
some socio-economists had developed a suggestive alternative theorizing according 
which a well-designed welfare could simultaneously enhance equity and dynamic 
efficiency, but the diffusion of this alternative paradigm was limited to Northern Europe, 
especially the Netherlands and social democratic Nordic economies. After the collapse 
of fully liberalized financial markets, the social demands for security by workers and 
families of emerging economies give a new chance to this alternative: a social security 
system might be the necessary complement to the turmoil generated by a fast social 
and technological transformation, as observed in China. An equivalent reappraisal is 
occurring in most Latin American nations.
7.2. The Complex and Multiple Determinants of Inequalities
Can it be said that there are universal laws governing inequalities? In the light of the 
last three decades, the Kuznets curve approach has not lost any relevance but has 
to be reassessed. On one side, the very rapid and intense productive modernization 
of China has been associated with a surge in sectoral, regional and individual 
inequalities, even if a long period of growth has drastically reduced poverty. Similarly, 
in developed economies, the erosion of Fordist mass production, its delocalization to 
emerging economies and the transition towards radically new productive paradigms – 
from information and communication technologies to sciences based biotech and even 
the new “financial industry” – have generated a new ascending phase in the Kuznets 
curve whereby growth and inequalities moved again synchronically. The domination 
of finance has reintroduced in the US wider inequalities, equivalent to those observed 
before the 1929 crash. Thus, financial fragility and rising inequalities go hand in hand. 
On the other side, Latin America has experienced a much more moderate productive 
modernization, but financialization has introduced other forms of inequalities compared 
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with those typical of rentier economies. The recent reduction of inequalities is not the 
“natural” consequence of invariant and universal mechanisms, but the outcome of 
a complex web of factors: a new dynamism of raw materials demands at the world 
level, learning from the previous economic crises, better response to social demands 
associated to the transition to more democratic regimes have made possible the search 
for an inclusive growth in Latin America.
7.3. Fordism and Social Democratic Regimes have Anticipated Inclusive 
 Growth in Latin America 
Past historical record falsifies the claim by neoclassical economists that growth with 
equity is impossible since the two objectives are contradictory. Studies inspired by 
Régulation Theory have shown that the impressive economic and social performances 
of the post-WWII Fordist mass production-mass consumption regime has been 
achieved by an institutionalization of wage formation, a reduction and stabilization of 
remuneration hierarchy and the implementation of universal welfare state covering 
a large variety of social risks (health, unemployment, training and retraining,…) and 
broad access to education. This has been observed in the US and most European 
countries and later under different forms in Japan and South Korea. These regimes 
entered a major crisis under the impact of the productivity growth slowdown, recurring 
struggles over income distribution, the internationalization of production and finally the 
domination of finance. Nevertheless, some social democratic societies, in Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland and Norway, have suffered equivalent world financial crises but the 
resilience of a basic political compromise has allowed reforms that have limited the 
explosion of inequalities. A priori, this is good news for contemporary Latin American 
strategies: inclusive growth is possible, provided stable socio-political alliances 
recurrently readjust the domestic institutional architecture and productive system to 
the changing social demands and the international context.
7.4. Less Globalization of Inequality than Coevolving Contrasted Inequality 
 Regimes
The buzz word “globalization” is a dangerous and misleading concept since it suggests 
that the same economic, social and political processes are operating similarly across 
continents and various societies. Since the explosion of inequalities during the last 
two decades has been quite general, this would suggest looking for a general and 
universal explanation of this structural change. By contrast, all the previous analyses 
point out the diversity of the trajectories among nations: US versus China, Southern 
versus Northern Europe, Latin America versus Asia and so on. Clearly, domestic 
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socioeconomic compromises matter and therefore contemporary societies are exploring 
different stages or configurations in the permanent struggle between the intrinsic trend 
towards inequality put into motion by capitalist accumulation and the capacity of social 
movements to counteract them and defend community, solidarity and security principles 
in response to the radical uncertainty typical of an unfettered capitalist competition. 
The contemporary societies are at different epochs of Polanyi’s dual movement. This 
analysis proposes to replace the concept of the globalization of inequalities by that 
of contrasting but interdependent inequality regimes. The finance-led inequalities in 
the US are associated to the “satanic mills” type inequalities occurring in China, and 
these two national trajectories do destabilize the welfare states of countries in the 
European Union. The stabilization of a more egalitarian growth in Latin America is up 
to the interplay of these three key actors: will the creeping Eurozone crisis turn into a 
complete breakdown or will the political contradictions in the US trigger a new financial 
meltdown and world crisis, not to speak about a possible major social and political 
crisis in China with devastating consequences for Latin America? Multiple, deep and 
contradictory interactions and entanglements, more than globalization, explain best 
the evolution of the world inequalities. This analytical framework also explains two 
major stylized facts: global inequality among individuals is reduced by the catching 
up of competition led growth strategies (China for instance) but increased within each 
nation-state given their specific inequality regimes.
7.5. Inequality: When Economic Power Shapes Political Processes
This embeddedness of individual inequality in specific national socioeconomic regimes 
is an invitation to overcome the methodological individualism implicit to most statistical 
analyses which frame inequality in terms of Gini or Theil indexes. Why not adopt 
instead a holistic individualism in which a set of basic social relations shapes the 
opportunities and constraints affecting individual strategies and consequently income 
and wealth distribution? This is precisely the objective of a lively multidisciplinary 
research program. Many researchers working within various sub-disciplines of social 
sciences – statisticians, historians, epidemiologists, sociologists, political scientists, 
socio-economists, political economists – now investigate the sources, evolution and 
consequences of economic, social, and political inequalities. Their efforts seem to 
converge towards a common understanding of the genesis of present inequalities. 
On one hand, large imperfections in markets are used by leading actors to exert 
oligopolistic and monopolistic economic power and appropriate a larger and larger 
fraction of national income and wealth. Thus, rising inequalities can best be seen as 
direct consequences of large asymmetries in the distribution of power in the economic 
sphere. On the other hand, the same powerful economic and financial actors, by their 
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access to political power, have acquired the ability to control the design of the regulations 
that shape their activity to their advantage, or conversely repeal any public supervision, 
regardless of the negative consequences for economic and financial stability or social 
cohesion. This framework is highly relevant for the US and UK societies that continue 
to be dominated by the power of Wall Street and the City of London. Nevertheless, this 
emerging theoretical approach is uniquely built upon the American and British cases. 
The precise processes operating in the US are not capturing the major factors that 
shape the evolution of inequalities in many other societies, for example in Germany 
or in Japan. The study of the interaction between economy and polity, politics and 
economics is also interesting for Latin America but specific investigations are required in 
order to detect the various processes that are not limited to the domination of financiers 
over nation-states, however important it might be elsewhere. How is power distributed 
in the different Latin American societies? This is the crucial issue for understanding 
the specificity of the large inequalities that have hampered the development of this 
continent, and might express themselves again if the inclusive growth strategy fails.
7.6. Inclusive	Growth:	An	Unfinished	Agenda
Precisely how can the permanent reduction of inequality launch a new growth pattern 
and define a long term and viable future for Latin America? Answering such a question 
would suppose a full understanding of the various processes and mechanisms that 
have generated the reversal of quasi secular trends. A survey of Latin American studies 
suggests that the ingredients have been multiple. Macroeconomists insist upon the 
positive consequences of the demand from industrializing Asian countries, since the 
export-led model has not been fully replaced by a domestic-led one, even in the case 
of Brazil, where the size of the domestic market and the degree of industrialization 
define the most favorable basis for the success of inward looking development. Other 
macroeconomists stress that governments have finally learnt from their recurring 
mistakes and they have adopted wiser policies that reduce the probability of a 
domestically generated major crisis. Welfare specialists point out the relative success 
of antipoverty strategies, but regret the absence of a fully-fledged welfare system, both 
in terms of stimulation of the domestic market and political legitimation of governments. 
Last but not least, political scientists argue that the transition to democratic regimes has 
been a precondition for most of the structural transformations previously mentioned. 
Within a régulationist approach, the viability of this new socio-economic regime 
depends on complementarity between the dynamism of the production and innovation 
system, the institutionalization of the wage labor nexus and the constitution of a 
welfare that would simultaneously provide a modicum of security for all and possibly 
enhance competitiveness. Specific studies are thus necessary in order to diagnose if 
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such a complementarity is actually emerging. In this respect, a comparative analysis 
of the process of emergence of modern welfare states could be enlightening for Latin 
American scholars and policy makers.
7.7. Do Not Forget Latin American Idiosyncrasies 
The anxious concerns about the consequences of rising inequalities has generated 
a vibrant international academic community that has developed common concepts, 
methods, statistical indexes and understandings. Does this set of analytical tools fully 
take into account the most salient issues for Latin America? How should we deal with 
the opposition within the formal and the informal sector? What are the consequences 
of an urbanization that is increasing faster than industrialization, upon the methods 
for alleviating poverty and reducing inequalities? What have been the long term 
consequences of the conflicts between natural resources exporters and industrialists 
upon economic policy – for instance the choice of an exchange rate regime and a 
fiscal system – and the difficult constitution of the welfare system? How are social and 
economic inequalities exacerbated by the imperfections in the democratic process? 
Some promising studies on Latin America propose a class-based point of departure 
for an overarching analysis of the various sources of inequalities. If one is convinced 
that “classes matter”, then the investigation of the links between growth and equity 
should take into account the complexity of social classes in Latin American that cannot 
be reduced to the typical capital/ conflict or to the opposition between industrialists 
and financiers or to the distribution of talents and competence among individuals, as 
assumed by the current measures of inequality. It may well be, that one urgent task of 
Latin American researchers is to renew with the founding fathers of ECLAC in order to 
coin indigenous concepts, indexes and paradigms that would capture more accurately 
of the specificity of their fields. This would in turn be a step in the direction of a more 
general theory that is not hostage to concepts rooted in specifically European and 
North American configurations.  
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